Consider an employee whose concentration is affected by persistent sleep disturbance. Her performance deteriorates and she receives a warning. A manager dismisses the medical explanation because others he knows have experienced menopause without similar difficulties. Alternatively, colleagues repeatedly question an employee about whether she is menopausal, despite her making clear that the subject is private.

Neither example is simply a matter of workplace sensitivity. Depending on the evidence, each may engage the prohibition on discrimination or harassment.

Irish case law is limited. UK decisions provide more developed examples, although they are persuasive rather than binding in Ireland. They also demonstrate why menopause should not be treated as a single legal category: gender, age and disability claims require different analyses.

The Irish equality framework

Menopause is not a separate protected ground under the Employment Equality Acts. The relevant grounds are primarily gender, age and disability.

Gender discrimination may arise where a woman is treated less favourably because of assumptions concerning menopause, or where a menopause-related medical explanation is assessed differently from comparable health conditions affecting men. Age discrimination may arise where decisions about performance, promotion or capability are influenced by stereotypes associated with an employee’s age.

The legislation also prohibits harassment related to a protected ground. Under section 14A, the question is whether unwanted conduct has the purpose or effect of violating dignity and creating the hostile or humiliating environment described in the provision. An unwelcome menopause-related remark is not automatically unlawful, but a manager’s intentions are not conclusive either.

Indirect discrimination presents a further possibility. A seemingly neutral attendance requirement, for example, may place employees of a particular gender at a disadvantage. Section 22 provides for objective justification where the employer pursues a legitimate aim through appropriate and necessary means. The disadvantage and the other statutory conditions must still be established; an inflexible policy is not automatically discriminatory.

Disability is different again. Section 2 defines disability broadly, including conditions involving the malfunction of bodily or mental functions. Significant menopause-related symptoms may fall within that definition, but menopause should not be classified as a disability in every case. The individual effects matter.

Where disability is established, section 16 requires appropriate measures to enable participation in employment unless they impose a disproportionate burden. Changes to working patterns, duties or the physical environment may be relevant. It is a distinct obligation, not a general entitlement to an employee’s preferred arrangement.

The practical error is to ask only whether menopause amounts to a disability. An employer may have no duty to provide disability accommodation in a particular case and still face a gender discrimination or harassment complaint arising from how it handled the issue.

There is an important evidential difference. Direct discrimination involves the reason for less favourable treatment; an appropriate actual or hypothetical comparator may be central. Indirect discrimination examines the effect of a workplace rule on a protected group and whether that rule can be justified. Reasonable accommodation concerns effective adjustments for a particular employee with a disability. A general appeal to fairness cannot replace those separate legal tests.

What the Irish cases tell us

In Rotunda Hospital v Siobhan McNally (EDA2148), proceedings involved gender and disability allegations, including harassment, victimisation and reasonable accommodation. The employee relied, among other matters, on stress and the effects of menopause. The dispute also involved an allegation of imputed disability: the employer’s perception of her medical capacity became relevant to the equality arguments.

The case illustrates how an employer’s assumptions about medical capacity can become part of an equality dispute. It should not, however, be presented as establishing that menopause itself constitutes a disability under Irish law.

A different lesson emerges from Ann O’Kane v Health Service Executive West (EDA084). The claimant referred to menopause-related questioning in an unsuccessful age discrimination complaint concerning an appointment process. The Labour Court did not consider the evidence sufficient to infer age discrimination.

That qualification is important. The mere mention of menopause does not prove discrimination. What was said, why it was said, the surrounding circumstances and its connection to the relevant employment decision all require examination.

These Irish proceedings do not yet provide a comprehensive body of guidance. The UK decisions help illustrate the distinctions.

Sex discrimination: when assumptions replace evidence

In Merchant v BT plc, an employee facing dismissal for poor performance provided medical evidence that menopause was affecting her concentration. The employer’s performance procedure contemplated investigating health-related causes of underperformance. Her manager did not take that step.

Instead, he relied on his understanding of menopause based on the experiences of his wife and another woman. The Employment Tribunal upheld claims of unfair dismissal and direct sex discrimination. It concluded that a comparable health concern affecting a male employee would have been investigated differently.

The decision does not mean that menopause excuses poor performance. It concerns the unequal treatment of a medical explanation. The manager substituted general assumptions for the individual evidence and departed from a process intended to identify relevant health factors.

That remains the point for Irish employers. A performance standard can be legitimate, and an employee may genuinely fall below it. However, once a credible medical explanation is advanced, the employer should examine it objectively rather than deciding that the symptoms cannot be serious because someone else experienced menopause differently.

The employer need not accept every assertion or defer management indefinitely. It should apply the same evidential discipline it would apply to a comparable health condition.

In practical terms, the employer should identify what the employee says is affecting performance, consider the available medical material and record why further enquiries are or are not necessary. A consistent procedure is important, but it must be applied thoughtfully rather than as a mechanism for disregarding relevant evidence.

Harassment: when a private matter becomes workplace commentary

Best v Embark on Raw Ltd (3202006/2020) concerned intrusive questioning about menopause and comments related to the employee’s age. The UK Employment Tribunal upheld harassment claims relating to sex and age, finding that the employer’s representative had pursued the subject after the employee made clear that she did not wish to discuss it.

The tribunal did not accept every allegation. Its finding arose from the particular conduct proved, including the invasion of the employee’s privacy.

There is an obvious distinction between a confidential discussion prompted by an employee’s request for assistance and a manager speculating about her menopausal status. Increased awareness of menopause does not entitle managers to ask personal medical questions or to make an employee’s health a subject of workplace conversation.

The same distinction matters under Irish section 14A. An employer should assess the actual conduct and its effect, not merely whether the speaker intended humour or believed the discussion was harmless.

Disability: symptoms, knowledge and causation

The UK disability decisions add another layer. In Rooney v Leicester City Council, the employee described extensive menopause-related symptoms affecting sleep, concentration and daily functioning. The Employment Appeal Tribunal found the original tribunal’s rejection of disability status legally flawed and remitted the issue. A subsequent preliminary tribunal hearing accepted that she was disabled during the material period.

Similarly, in Donnachie v Telent Technology Services Ltd, a preliminary tribunal found disability established on the particular evidence of the employee’s symptoms. Neither decision establishes that menopause is invariably a disability, or that identifying a disability proves discrimination.

There is a further limitation: the UK Equality Act 2010 generally requires a substantial and long-term adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities. Irish disability legislation is differently worded. UK findings are useful illustrations of individual assessment, not substitutes for applying the Irish statutory definition.

Gallacher v Abellio ScotRail Ltd is the necessary counterpoint. Menopause-related symptoms and depression were accepted as disabilities for the purposes of the proceedings. The employee’s disability discrimination claim nevertheless failed. The tribunal found that the breakdown in working relations had not arisen because of disability and that the employer did not have the requisite knowledge of disability at the relevant time. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal.

Gallacher does not grant employers permission to dispense with fair procedures whenever relationships become difficult; its dismissal finding was highly fact-specific. It does demonstrate that disability status, employer knowledge and the reason for the treatment are separate questions. The existence of menopause-related symptoms does not make every adverse employment decision discriminatory.

What employers should do

The immediate risk is often not the absence of a standalone menopause policy. It is the way ordinary management procedures are applied.

Performance and attendance decisions should be supported by evidence. If an employee identifies menopausal symptoms as affecting her work, the employer should consider whether further medical or occupational health information is needed before reaching a conclusion. Managers should avoid relying on assumptions about how symptoms ought to present or how long they should last.

Where disability may be involved, reasonable accommodation should be considered on the individual facts. Measures could include changes to working hours, access to suitable facilities, temperature adjustments or temporary changes to duties. Operational requirements remain relevant, and the statute does not require measures imposing a disproportionate burden. But reasons for rejecting a practical adjustment should be capable of explanation.

Confidentiality matters just as much. Managers should focus on the work-related difficulty and potential response, not invite unnecessary disclosures about personal medical history. Employees should know how to raise concerns without being exposed to speculation or unwanted commentary from colleagues.

The same discipline should apply before dismissal. Employers should distinguish capability concerns from misconduct or a breakdown in working relations, test any connection with a known medical condition and preserve contemporaneous reasons for their decisions. This is ordinary management practice, but it becomes particularly important where a protected ground may be engaged.

A menopause policy can provide a useful route for confidential discussions and manager training. It is not, however, a substitute for complying with the Employment Equality Acts. Nor is there a general statutory requirement that every Irish employer have a dedicated menopause policy.

Employers should review whether performance, absence, grievance and equality procedures work together in practice. An employee who discloses symptoms during a capability process should not have to start an entirely separate procedure before the information is considered.

The UK cases are fact-specific and not binding in Ireland. Their common lesson is nonetheless persuasive: employers should assess the person, the evidence and the decision rather than rely on generalisations about menopause.

The relevant legal issue may be gender discrimination, age discrimination, harassment or disability-related treatment. These routes are not interchangeable. They require different findings and may lead to different outcomes.

For Irish employers, the appropriate response is therefore neither to assume that menopause is always a disability nor to dismiss it as simply a normal stage of life. It is to ensure that decisions about employees experiencing menopause can be justified under the equality law that already applies.

The post Menopause at Work: An Equality Issue, Not Simply a Wellbeing Issue appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

Working arrangements governing hours, communication, performance or workplace conduct may appear neutral but create a particular barrier for an employee with a disability. Where that occurs, the Employment Equality Acts may require the employer to consider appropriate measures to address the disadvantage.

The Labour Court’s decision in Omniplex Cork Limited v Dylan O’Riordan (EDA2620) provides a useful illustration of how that obligation can arise in the context of neurodiversity and ordinary workplace management, particularly rostering.

The decision does not create a new legal test for neurodiversity. Its significance lies in applying established equality principles to everyday management decisions, particularly rostering, and in examining whether the employer’s response addressed the employee’s actual needs.

Neurodiversity and the law

Neurodiversity recognises natural differences in how people think, learn, communicate and experience their surroundings. Neurodivergence commonly describes neurological differences including autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), dyslexia and dyspraxia.

Neurodiversity is not a separate protected ground under Irish employment equality legislation. The relevant protection generally arises under the disability ground in the Employment Equality Acts.

Section 2 of the Employment Equality Act 1998 defines disability broadly. It includes conditions causing a person to learn differently and conditions affecting thought processes, perception, emotions or judgement. Depending on their nature and effects, autism and other neurodevelopmental conditions may therefore come within that statutory definition.

But identifying a disability and identifying the accommodation required are different exercises. A diagnosis does not automatically establish an entitlement to particular hours or a different reporting structure. Equally, successful performance over several years does not mean a disability-related difficulty cannot arise later.

The practical effect will vary from person to person. For example, one employee with ADHD may find written priorities or greater structure helpful, while an autistic employee may identify unpredictable shifts or particular environmental conditions as barriers. Another employee with the same diagnosis may require no adjustment at all.

Sections 6 and 8 prohibit discrimination on protected grounds, including disability, in important aspects of employment. Apparently neutral requirements can also give rise to indirect discrimination where the statutory conditions are met. Disability equality, however, goes further through a distinct positive obligation.

Section 16(3) requires an employer to take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person with a disability to access, participate in or advance in employment, or undertake training. This duty is subject to the qualification that the measures must not impose a disproportionate burden.

Section 16(4) identifies practical measures including changes to working-time patterns, the distribution of tasks, premises, equipment and training resources. This is sometimes mistaken for preferential treatment. It is not. The purpose is to address disadvantages created by the way a particular workplace is organised, rather than assuming existing arrangements must always remain unchanged. Indirect discrimination and the section 16 duty are distinct legal routes; Omniplex principally concerns the latter.

The question is not merely whether the employee can comply with the job as currently organised, but whether a reasonable adjustment would remove or reduce the barrier.

A requirement that every duty manager work rotating closing shifts may suit most employees. If the pattern creates a particular disability-related barrier for one manager, the employer must examine whether it can reasonably be adjusted. It cannot treat uniform application of the rule as a complete answer.

The Omniplex case

Mr Dylan O’Riordan disclosed that he was autistic when he joined Omniplex Cork Limited in March 2022, but did not require accommodation.

He later experienced increasing difficulties with unpredictable rosters and late closing shifts. He sought greater consistency, two consecutive rest days and fewer late finishes both informally and later formally. Nothing was done.

Following a workplace incident in October 2023, he commenced certified sick leave.

An occupational health assessment in January 2024 recommended more consistent and earlier shifts, structured breaks, sensory supports and a workplace needs assessment. Some measures were provided. However, the principal rostering issue remained unresolved.

The Labour Court accepted that he had articulated both his difficulties and the measures sought from an early stage. This finding matters where accommodation requests first arise in informal discussions with managers rather than through HR procedures.

The Labour Court upheld liability and increased compensation from €12,000 awarded by the WRC to €29,000, approximately one year’s gross salary. It accepted that the employer had provided some supports and engaged in discussions, but gave particular weight to the delay before meaningful engagement on a suitable roster and the close alignment between the employee’s requests and occupational health advice.

Critically, the employer had not established a cogent case that the requested adjustments would be ineffective or disproportionately burdensome. The Court concluded that the relevant arrangements could have been addressed in time.

The award was compensation for the effects of discrimination, not an automatic entitlement to a year’s pay. The Court referred to the principle in Von Colson and Kamann (Case 14/83) that remedies for discrimination must be effective and sufficiently dissuasive.

What the decision tells employers

The first lesson is that awareness of a diagnosis is not the same as understanding its implications at work. Mr O’Riordan disclosed his autism at recruitment but did not then require accommodation. His subsequent promotion did not remove the need to assess difficulties arising later. A capable, high-performing employee can still require adjustments when responsibilities or circumstances change.

Secondly, an employee need not invoke section 16 or complete a formal application before an employer responds. A general complaint about a roster is different from explaining that the roster creates difficulties because of a disability. Once management has reliable information connecting a workplace difficulty with a disability, the prudent course is to investigate the position and consider appropriate measures rather than waiting for a formal grievance or a request framed in legal terminology. Line managers need to recognise and escalate those requests.

Thirdly, welfare support and workplace accommodation serve different purposes. Counselling, an Employee Assistance Programme or a GP referral may be appropriate. None makes an unpredictable roster predictable. Equally, providing a quiet room does not necessarily address late closing shifts. Each significant barrier must be examined, and each proposed measure assessed for effectiveness.

Fourthly, engagement is not itself the outcome required by the legislation. Correspondence, meetings and occupational health referrals are relevant evidence, but they cannot substitute for an effective decision. Employers are entitled to propose alternatives to an employee’s preferred arrangement, provided those alternatives genuinely address the need identified.

Timing also matters. Section 16 does not prescribe a fixed response period, but prolonged delay can allow health, absence and the employment relationship to deteriorate. A trial arrangement may be sensible, although its review mechanism must not defeat its purpose. Where stability is the accommodation, frequent unexplained changes may preserve the problem rather than resolve it.

The limits of reasonable accommodation

The duty is not unlimited. Employers remain entitled to maintain legitimate service standards, assess safety and staffing needs, and consider the effects of proposed changes on colleagues. An employee cannot simply insist upon their preferred arrangement without regard to the business.

Under section 16(3)(c), the disproportionate burden assessment includes financial and other costs, the scale and resources of the employer’s business, and the availability of public funding or assistance.

A stable roster may have implications for peak-period coverage, management availability and the distribution of less desirable shifts. Those matters are legitimate, but should be evidenced. Where flexibility is relied upon to resist an adjustment, the strength of the employer’s position will depend on the operational evidence supporting that requirement.

Employers should also explore less burdensome alternatives, temporary arrangements and available assistance. The Government’s Work and Access programme can assist with workplace needs assessments and certain supports, subject to its terms. A reasoned refusal may be defensible. A refusal based on general assumptions about inconvenience or fairness to colleagues is harder to sustain.

The Supreme Court in Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63 confirmed that capability must be assessed in light of reasonable accommodation. Employers must genuinely consider reorganising tasks; the legislation does not impose a rigid separation between essential duties and peripheral tasks. It does not, however, require the creation of an entirely different job.

The Court of Justice subsequently confirmed in HR Rail (Case C-485/20) that reasonable accommodation may include transfer to a suitable existing vacancy where the employee is competent, capable and available, subject to disproportionate burden. Employers considering the end of employment should therefore examine appropriate alternatives rather than assume the existing job arrangement is immutable.

Putting the duty into practice

An effective response requires more than an equality policy. Employers should ensure that someone takes responsibility for moving an individual request from initial disclosure to a reasoned decision.

The process should begin by recording what the employee has explained and identifying the working arrangement or duty causing difficulty. Management should then seek proportionate occupational health or specialist advice where necessary, focused on functional effects and practical adjustments rather than a broad medical history.

Where occupational health recommends a specialist workplace needs assessment, postponing it until return to work may be counterproductive if the assessment is needed to make that return possible. Proportionate interim measures may also be appropriate while further evidence is obtained.

The employee’s proposal and workable alternatives should be assessed against the actual requirements of the role. If an adjustment is refused, the employer should record the operational or financial evidence, the alternatives considered and why they were unsuitable. Agreed measures need an implementation date, responsible person and sensible review arrangements.

This is particularly important in neurodiversity cases, where relatively modest changes to communication, working time or the physical environment may make a substantial difference. It is also important for managers who control rosters and workloads: they may be the first to receive an accommodation request, before HR is involved.

Omniplex is not authority for granting every request. It is a reminder that equal treatment on paper may still leave a disability-related barrier in place. What matters is whether the employer recognised the difficulty, considered effective measures promptly and can explain, with evidence, the decision it ultimately made.

That is the difference between acknowledging neurodiversity and meeting the obligation to accommodate it.

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The Employment Equality and Institutional Burials (Amendment) Bill 2026 completed its passage through both Houses of the Oireachtas on 20 October 2026. The legislation is intended to make reporting through the Government’s Gender Pay Gap Portal compulsory, while retaining the existing obligation on employers to publish their reports.

The Gender Pay Gap Portal itself is already operational. Having launched on a voluntary basis in November 2025, it now provides public access to gender pay gap information submitted by participating employers. The Department of Children, Disability and Equality’s guidance describes mandatory portal reporting as applicable to the 2026 reporting cycle.

At first glance, the change appears largely administrative. Employers are already required to calculate and publish prescribed remuneration information. The portal introduces a central mechanism for submitting information that is, in substance, already being produced.

However, the implications extend beyond the filing process. Centralised reporting makes employers’ figures more accessible and facilitates comparisons between organisations and sectors. It also places greater emphasis on the explanations employers provide for the differences identified.

For employers, the issue is no longer simply whether the calculations are accurate. It is whether the published information, considered as a whole, presents a credible and properly supported account of the organisation’s position.

What the new legislation changes

Section 2 of the Employment Equality and Institutional Burials (Amendment) Bill 2026 amends section 20A of the Employment Equality Act 1998 to provide for regulations requiring employers both to publish gender pay gap information and to report that information to the Minister for Children, Disability and Equality.

The accompanying employer statement, which explains the reasons for identified remuneration differences and the measures being taken or proposed to address them, is also included in the proposed reporting arrangements.

The legislation goes further than establishing an electronic submission process.

It enables regulations requiring employers to confirm the accuracy of their reported information and statements, insofar as they are aware at the time of reporting. It also provides for standards governing employer statements and procedures through which the Minister may review statements, require amendments and direct resubmission where prescribed requirements have not been met.

Importantly, the legislation also contemplates mechanisms allowing gender pay gap information to be compared between employers and across business or employment sectors.

These additional requirements are subject to the regulations made under the amended legislation. The employment provisions also require commencement by Ministerial order.

Although the Department’s current guidance describes portal reporting as mandatory for 2026, employers should verify the operative commencement and implementing regulations before filing. The existing statutory publication obligations remain unaffected by that verification.

The central point is that gender pay gap reporting is becoming more than a disclosure on an individual employer’s website. The information is being brought together in a format designed to make comparison easier.

That development warrants closer consideration.

Greater transparency does not necessarily mean straightforward comparisons

Gender pay gap figures are useful indicators, but they do not explain themselves.

The statutory calculations measure differences in remuneration between male and female employees across an organisation. Those differences may reflect several factors, including workforce composition, seniority, occupational distribution, working arrangements and bonus structures.

A reported gender pay gap does not, of itself, establish unlawful unequal pay. An employer may pay men and women equally for the same work while still reporting a material aggregate gap because of the distribution of employees across different roles and grades.

Equally, a comparatively modest gender pay gap does not establish that an employer has complied with all its equal-pay obligations.

The distinction becomes particularly relevant when figures are compared between organisations.

Two employers operating within the same sector may have substantially different workforce structures. One may have a higher proportion of employees in senior management or specialist professional roles. Another may employ a larger proportion of staff in operational or part-time positions.

Their reported figures may therefore differ for reasons that are not apparent from the headline percentages.

The risk is that greater accessibility encourages conclusions based on figures that require further explanation.

In our view, this is where the employer statement assumes particular importance. A properly considered explanation can identify the relevant organisational factors, explain their effect on the reported figures and distinguish between existing differences and measures intended to address them.

However, an explanation should not become an exercise in defending the figures at all costs.

If an employer attributes its gender pay gap to a greater representation of men in senior positions, that may explain the calculation. It also raises a legitimate question about the organisation’s recruitment, retention and progression arrangements.

The existence of an explanation does not necessarily mean that there is nothing requiring attention.

The employer statement should be supported by the evidence

The obligation to explain gender pay gap differences is already established under the Employment Equality Act 1998 (Section 20A) (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2022.

Where the prescribed information discloses remuneration differences, employers must publish a written statement setting out, in their opinion, the reasons for those differences and the measures, if any, being taken or proposed to eliminate or reduce them.

This is a substantive statutory requirement. It should not be approached as an opportunity to repeat general corporate commitments to diversity and equality.

An employer stating that remuneration differences arise from workforce composition should be able to demonstrate that its underlying data supports that explanation.

Similarly, where bonus arrangements contribute to the reported gap, the employer should understand whether the difference arises from eligibility, participation, the distribution of senior roles or the operation of the relevant bonus structures.

The explanation should follow from the evidence, rather than the evidence being selectively presented to support a preferred explanation.

There is also a distinction between identifying the cause of a difference and explaining what the employer intends to do about it.

For example, identifying an imbalance in senior management may support a commitment to review recruitment or progression arrangements. However, commitments should reflect measures that the organisation has genuinely adopted or is realistically proposing.

Employers should distinguish between actions already implemented, measures under consideration and outcomes that remain uncertain.

Particular care is also required where small employee groups are involved. An explanation should provide sufficient context without disclosing personal information or allowing individual employees to be identified unnecessarily.

The proposed Ministerial review arrangements give these considerations additional relevance, although the precise standards and procedures will depend on the implementing regulations. The Minister addressed the intended safeguards during the Seanad debate on 20 October 2026.

A credible statement need not be lengthy. It should, however, demonstrate that the employer understands its figures and has considered what they reveal about its workforce.

Mandatory portal reporting does not replace publication

The move to centralised reporting should not obscure the obligations already imposed on employers.

For the 2026 reporting cycle, the existing statutory regime applies to employers with 50 or more employees on their selected June snapshot date.

Employers must report prescribed mean and median remuneration differences, including relevant part-time and temporary-contract figures, bonus information and the distribution of male and female employees across remuneration quartiles.

The reporting period covers the twelve months ending on the selected snapshot date.

Following the 2025 amendment regulations, employers have five months from their selected June snapshot date to publish the prescribed information.

The deadline is therefore determined by the employer’s chosen date, rather than a universal deadline of 30 November.

The information and accompanying statement must continue to be published on the employer’s website in a manner accessible to employees and the public. Where an employer has no website, the regulations provide for physical inspection at its registered office or principal place of business during normal business hours.

The published information must remain available for at least three years.

Portal submission is intended to supplement these obligations, not replace them.

Employers should therefore ensure that the version submitted through the portal corresponds with the information approved for publication. Inconsistent figures, explanations or reporting periods could undermine confidence in an otherwise properly prepared report.

The practical answer is to treat publication and portal submission as connected stages of a single reporting process, with appropriate internal approval and version control.

A broader issue of disclosure governance

The new reporting arrangements also raise a question about how employers manage public disclosures concerning their workforce.

Gender pay gap reports typically draw on information held across payroll, HR and management functions. The calculations may be technically correct without the accompanying narrative having received the same level of examination.

That approach is increasingly difficult to justify where information is being placed on a central platform designed to facilitate public comparison.

Employers should establish who is responsible for validating the underlying data, reviewing the explanation, approving proposed measures and authorising publication.

They should also retain appropriate supporting records demonstrating how the calculations were prepared and how the final report was approved. These records should be managed under the organisation’s applicable retention policies, separately from the statutory requirement to keep the published report available for three years.

The exercise should involve more than a final review of the numbers. Where the reported figures disclose significant differences, employers should consider whether those findings are consistent with their understanding of remuneration arrangements, workforce composition and opportunities for progression.

This does not mean that every gender pay gap requires an immediate structural intervention. Nor should an employer make commitments that cannot reasonably be delivered.

It does mean that material differences deserve examination before an explanation is published.

The portal reforms should also be distinguished from the wider obligations contemplated by the EU Pay Transparency Directive (Directive (EU) 2023/970). The Minister has confirmed that further legislation is required to complete Ireland’s transposition of that Directive.

While the immediate priority is the 2026 reporting cycle, employers should recognise that the direction of travel is towards greater transparency concerning remuneration and the factors influencing it.

What employers should do now

With the November reporting period approaching, employers should complete and validate their calculations, review the supporting statement and ensure that responsibility for final approval is clearly assigned.

The published report and portal submission should be consistent. Employers should also confirm their individual publication deadline, retain evidence of publication and check the applicable commencement and regulatory requirements governing portal filing.

The more substantial task is to ensure that the figures have been properly understood.

Centralised reporting does not necessarily change the reasons why an employer has a gender pay gap. It changes how readily those reasons may be examined and compared.

The statutory obligation to provide an explanation already exists. The new portal arrangements make the quality of that explanation considerably more important.

For employers, effective compliance will depend not only on reporting the figures accurately, but on being able to explain what those figures mean and what, if anything, the organisation intends to do about them.

The post New gender pay gap portal legislation: mandatory reporting and greater scrutiny for employers appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

Part 1: “AI-generated grievances: who is really making the allegation?” — Friday 16 October 2026. Part 2: “Shadow AI and workplace grievances: when can employers take disciplinary action?” — Sunday 18 October 2026.

An employee’s right to raise a grievance does not confer unrestricted authority to upload confidential workplace information to an external AI platform. Nor does it necessarily shield independently established misconduct committed while preparing or pursuing that complaint.

Shadow AI can turn a grievance into a security incident

When an employee uses an unapproved AI platform to prepare a grievance, the first question is what information they have entered into that system.

The document may contain confidential emails, internal investigation reports, commercial information, witness statements, payroll details, medical information or personal information concerning colleagues. An employee may upload that material believing they are simply asking a writing tool to help prepare a complaint.

However, depending on the service and its contractual arrangements, information may be processed, stored or accessed outside the employer’s approved systems. The employer may have no visibility over what has been entered, where the information is held, how long it will be retained or whether it may be used for other purposes.

This is commonly described as shadow AI: the use of AI services outside an organisation’s approved systems and controls. The risks are not speculative in principle, although the consequences of any particular upload depend on the tool, its configuration and the information entered.

Employers may, in principle, prohibit the entry of confidential company material and other people’s personal data into unapproved AI systems when grievances or appeals are prepared. Such a rule must be clear, reasonable and enforced consistently. It must not be drafted or applied to obstruct protected disclosures, permitted reporting, legal advice or trade union representation.

An express rule matters. Employers should identify which tools are approved, which categories of information must never be entered into external systems, how potential incidents are to be reported and the possible disciplinary consequences of breach. Where an employee contravenes a lawful and reasonable information- security instruction, the conduct may merit separate investigation.

The Data Protection Commission’s guidance on AI, large language models and data protection expressly identifies the risks associated with personal information entered into third-party AI tools. The problem should therefore be considered from two perspectives.

• First, has the employee breached a confidentiality, acceptable-use or information-security obligation?
• Secondly, has the organisation experienced a personal data breach requiring assessment and potentially notification?

Under Article 33 of the General Data Protection Regulation, a notifiable personal data breach must generally be reported within 72 hours of the controller becoming aware of it, where feasible. Notification is not required where the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals’ rights and freedoms.

Under Article 33 of the General Data Protection Regulation, a notifiable personal data breach must generally be reported within 72 hours of the controller becoming aware of it, where feasible. Notification is not required where the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals’ rights and freedoms.

Not every unauthorised upload is a notifiable personal data breach. But it must be assessed promptly, independently of the merits of the employee’s grievance.

What if the employee’s declaration is inaccurate?

Part 1 proposed a declaration authenticating the employee’s factual account. If reliable evidence later contradicts it, the employer may seek an explanation and assess whether the discrepancy was material and knowing. That does not prove that the underlying grievance was invented.

A suspicion that text ‘looks like AI’, or an automated detection score, is not proof. The employee should be told what is in issue, given the opportunity to respond, and assessed against actual evidence. The possible effect on credibility is distinct from whether there has been disciplinary misconduct.

This approach also guards against retaliation claims. An employer should continue to investigate any separately identifiable discrimination, safety or protected-disclosure concern even while examining a potentially false declaration. Those parallel inquiries should not be allowed to become a means of penalising the employee for having complained.

When does AI misuse become a disciplinary matter?

The answer is not determined by whether AI was used. A genuine grievance, even one drafted with substantial assistance, remains a grievance. Equally, the decision to make a complaint does not place all conduct surrounding it beyond the employer’s ordinary rules.

An employee who knowingly discloses restricted information to a prohibited system, deliberately falsifies material allegations or knowingly makes a material misstatement in an authentication declaration may face disciplinary proceedings. These are different allegations and require their own factual basis and due process. A mistaken legal citation or an inaccurate AI-generated phrase is not necessarily dishonesty.

The potentially disciplinary matter is the independently established conduct, not AI authorship. Section 6(4) (b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 recognises conduct as a potentially fair reason for dismissal. Whether the actual sanction is reasonable remains a separate question, requiring a proportionate response and fair procedures.

In The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v Reilly [2015] IEHC 241, the High Court considered an employee’s breach of an email policy. The Court did not accept that the breach justified dismissal in the circumstances. The judgment illustrates the danger of assuming that a stated zero-tolerance policy converts every breach into gross misconduct. A clear rule is important; seriousness, consistent enforcement and proportionality remain essential.

An employee who deliberately uploads a confidential investigation report to an expressly prohibited external system presents a materially different case from someone using an AI writing assistant to improve grammar. Likewise, proof of substantive AI assistance may reveal an inaccurate declaration, but it does not establish that the underlying workplace event was invented. Employers need to identify what was false, what the employee knew and what harm or risk the conduct created.

Those distinctions matter. There is also a more serious complication where the underlying grievance concerns discrimination or protected disclosures. Under section 74(2) of the Employment Equality Act 1998, employees are protected against adverse treatment arising in reaction to certain equality-related complaints and other protected acts. Likewise, section 12 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 prohibits penalisation for making a protected disclosure.

Section 12(7C) is particularly significant. In relevant WRC penalisation proceedings, the adverse treatment is presumed to have resulted from the protected disclosure unless the employer establishes that it was based on “duly justified grounds”.

The employer must be able to establish that any sanction rests on the separate conduct, not on the employee’s exercise of protected rights. That requires contemporaneous evidence, fair notice of the allegation and, where practicable, decision-makers independent of the grievance investigation.

That separation will be important if the employee later alleges retaliation.

Write the rules before the dispute arises

Many employers have introduced general AI policies addressing productivity, confidentiality and the use of technology in daily work. Far fewer have considered the particular risks associated with AI-generated grievances, disciplinary appeals and internal investigations.

It is our view that grievance and disciplinary procedures should now deal expressly with factual authentication and the handling of sensitive information through AI tools. The object is not to ban writing assistance. It is to require accurate factual accounts, prohibit unauthorised disclosure and distinguish careless drafting from deliberate misconduct.

Suggested wording for an AI-use policy

• Employees may obtain appropriate assistance when preparing grievances, disciplinary responses or appeals. However, employees must not upload or disclose the Company’s confidential information, personal data relating to other individuals, investigation material or other restricted workplace information to an AI system which has not been expressly approved for that purpose.
• Where proportionate, an employee may be asked to adopt the factual allegations submitted in their name and disclose substantive AI drafting assistance. They must be given a reasonable opportunity to clarify or correct their account.
• Employees must not knowingly submit fabricated evidence, knowingly make a materially false factual- authentication declaration or deliberately use repetitive or misleading material to obstruct a fair internal procedure. Disagreement with the merits of a complaint, without more, does not establish misconduct.
• Suspected serious breaches of AI-use, confidentiality or information-security rules may be investigated under the disciplinary procedure. Any sanction will be assessed on the proved conduct, context, and seriousness.
• Nothing in this policy prevents an employee from seeking legal or trade union advice, raising a grievance, making a protected disclosure, exercising statutory rights or participating in legal proceedings.

The final qualification is essential.

In particular, section 23 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 renders void contractual provisions which purport to prohibit or restrict protected disclosures or exclude the statutory protections. An AI policy must not become an indirect mechanism for preventing employees from reporting wrongdoing or obtaining independent advice. However, that does not mean employers must tolerate the unrestricted use of their confidential information in unapproved technological systems.

The same standard should bind the employer. HR teams and investigators should not upload witness statements or grievance files to unapproved AI services. Even where approved tools assist with drafting, the investigator remains responsible for findings. Employers cannot demand human accountability from employees while outsourcing their own judgment to a machine.

Record the assistance; assess the evidence

Where substantive AI use is admitted or reasonably established, the nature and extent of that assistance, insofar as ascertainable, should be noted in the grievance file and investigation report. The use of AI does not itself defeat a complaint.

In our view, factual authentication must have meaningful consequences. Where an employee, having been afforded a reasonable opportunity to clarify their position and obtain any necessary assistance, refuses without adequate explanation to stand over material allegations, the employer should be entitled to take that refusal into account when assessing their credibility.

Depending on the circumstances, an investigator may reasonably draw an adverse inference and attach reduced weight to allegations which the employee is unwilling or unable to verify. This is particularly relevant where the allegations are unsupported by other evidence or where concerns have arisen regarding their accuracy or origin.

Such an inference should not be automatic, nor should it prevent the employer from examining genuine discrimination, safety or protected-disclosure concerns. However, an employee cannot reasonably expect every allegation advanced in their name to be treated as credible while declining, without justification, to confirm its factual basis. Authentication should be a substantive safeguard in the grievance process, not an administrative formality.

Furthermore, as discussed in Part 1, generative AI has made it considerably easier for employees to produce extensive submissions, introduce additional allegations and repeatedly reformulate existing complaints. The difficulty for employers is not simply the volume of material received, but the potential for an otherwise manageable grievance to become an open-ended process.

In our view, employers are entitled to exercise reasonable control over that process. Once an employee has been afforded an appropriate opportunity to particularise their complaint, the employer should identify the matters requiring investigation and establish a clearly defined scope. Further submissions should be assessed by reference to whether they introduce genuinely new facts or materially affect the issues under consideration.

There is no general obligation to reopen an investigation whenever an employee submits another version of an existing complaint. Employers may impose reasonable deadlines, require correspondence to be directed through designated channels and decline to revisit matters already addressed, provided that genuine new allegations and protected concerns receive appropriate consideration.

A more difficult question arises where an employee persistently generates repetitive, misleading or irrelevant material which serves no legitimate purpose and obstructs the investigation. In such circumstances, employers should be prepared to consider whether that conduct independently breaches reasonable workplace rules. Any disciplinary response must be supported by evidence of the conduct itself, rather than an assumption that extensive correspondence or AI use necessarily amounts to misconduct.

SPOTLIGHT | The employer’s enforcement checklist

• Review AI and confidentiality policies. Expressly address the use of unapproved AI tools in grievances, disciplinary matters, investigations and protected workplace information.
• Create an AI-related security escalation procedure. Where unauthorised data disclosure is suspected, involve the relevant information-security and data-protection personnel promptly. Assess the potential incident separately from the grievance.
• Investigate any alleged misconduct separately. Put the evidence and the relevant rule to the employee, assess the explanation and ensure any sanction is proportionate.
• Protect statutory rights. Ensure that none of these measures prevents protected disclosures, equality complaints, representation or access to legal remedies. Apply appropriate accommodations and record the independent reasons for any adverse employment decision.

The practical position is not complicated, but it demands discipline. Establish what entered the AI tool. Identify the rule said to have been breached. Preserve the employee’s right to pursue a genuine complaint. And require the same independent judgment from the employer’s investigators as from the employee who brought it.

Alastair Purdy LLP advises employers on grievances, investigations, protected disclosures and the fair enforcement of workplace AI and information-security rules.

The post Shadow AI and workplace grievances: when can employers take disciplinary action? appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

Founded in 1996 and based in Dublin, Safety Solutions Group provides specialist health and safety training, risk management and compliance services to organisations across Ireland. Through its Safe Cert division, it also provides machinery and equipment inspections and statutory certification.

Following the acquisition, Safety Solutions Group has become part of Celnor’s Risk Management Division. The transaction represents Celnor’s fourth acquisition in Ireland and strengthens the group’s specialist training, certification and compliance capabilities.

Robin Hyde, Partner at AP LLP, advised the sellers on the transaction. Xeinadin Ireland supported Safety Solutions Group throughout the sale process.

We congratulate the parties on the transaction and acknowledge the contribution of Cormac Smith and the Xeinadin Ireland team.

Further information is available in Celnor Group’s transaction announcement.

The post AP LLP Advises on Sale of Safety Solutions Group to Celnor Group appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

Part 1: “AI-generated grievances: who is really making the allegation?” — Friday 16 October 2026. Part 2: “Shadow AI and workplace grievances: when can employers take disciplinary action?” — Sunday 18 October 2026.

A grievance ought to tell an employer what happened in the employee’s own words. Now with AI tools being so readily accessible, it may arrive as a legal submission which the employee neither drafted nor fully understands. Whilst, the employer must respond to genuine concerns, it should not be expected to investigate every theory a machine can produce.

An employee may genuinely object to a performance meeting or a manager’s conduct. Feed that account into a generative AI tool, however, and it may return allegations of discrimination, victimisation or procedural impropriety which the employee never intended to make. Some may warrant investigation. Others may have no discernible factual basis.

The employer is left with both the grievance and the technology’s embellishments. That should not be the starting point for an investigation. The first task is to identify the actual complaint, not simply accept every legal characterisation in the document.

Irish employment law has yet to settle how internal procedures should deal with AI-written grievances. The response now emerging from the WRC and the courts is nevertheless instructive: the person advancing a factual account must be capable of standing over it. Employers should be prepared to apply that principle themselves.

What the WRC decisions actually show

In Oliveira v Ryanair DAC, ADJ-00055225 (1 October 2025), an unrepresented employee pursued equality complaints concerning race, family status, harassment and victimisation. At the first hearing, extensive documentation had been produced but the particulars needed to answer the complaints had not been identified. The adjudication officer adjourned the matter to allow the employee to clarify his case and the employer to respond. The subsequent submissions contained authorities which were irrelevant, misquoted or non-existent.

The adjudication officer criticised the use of ‘phantom citations’, describing the approach as ‘egregious and an abuse of process’. The complaints ultimately turned on the absence of the necessary proof, rather than on a general prohibition against AI. For employers, the concern is one of credibility: reliance on legal material (or any material for that matter) that does not exist invites scrutiny of the account in which it appears.

The problem of volume and particularity arose again in Goncalves v Valshan Unlimited, ADJ-00056185 (11 December 2025). The employer’s representatives challenged the reliability and apparent AI origins of extensive pre-hearing material, with the case file approaching 2,000 pages. The complainant herself acknowledged using AI to organise her case. The adjudicator experienced considerable difficulty identifying a coherent chronology and the factual basis of the individual complaints.

The adjudicator was concerned about the apparent absence of human oversight and struggled to isolate the chronology. She therefore sought the complainant’s own oral account. That is the important feature of the decision: a lengthy written case cannot substitute for evidence of what the complainant says actually happened. However, it does not follow that every AI-assisted submission was inadmissible.

In Ferko v Beyond Reach Limited trading as Car Wash Crew, ADJ-00060622 (2 March 2026) , the dispute was narrower. The employee alleged that his written employment terms had been furnished approximately a year late. His sister had prepared the WRC complaint form using AI, and he accepted that he was not fully familiar with its contents. The adjudication officer preferred the employer’s evidence about its induction procedure and the provision of written terms within days of commencement. The employee’s difficulty explaining and verifying the allegations reduced the weight of his evidence. The adjudicator observed that “a complainant remains responsible for the accuracy of allegations made on his behalf”.

In Ferko v Beyond Reach Limited trading as Car Wash Crew, ADJ-00060622 (2 March 2026), the dispute was narrower. The employee alleged that his written employment terms had been furnished approximately a year late. His sister had prepared the WRC complaint form using AI, and he accepted that he was not fully familiar with its contents. The adjudication officer preferred the employer’s evidence about its induction procedure and the provision of written terms within days of commencement. The employee’s difficulty explaining and verifying the allegations reduced the weight of his evidence. The adjudicator observed that “a complainant remains responsible for the accuracy of allegations made on his behalf”.

These cases do not make AI use a ground for rejecting a complaint. They illustrate a more practical problem: the quality of the drafting tells the employer very little about what the employee can actually establish. It is the facts, and the person prepared to stand over them, that matter.

The WRC’s approach: the submission remains the party’s responsibility

The WRC Guidance on the use of AI tools to prepare material for submission to the WRC was first issued on 20 October 2025 and updated on 26 May 2026. It is guidance for parties in WRC proceedings, not a statutory Code of Practice on the conduct of internal grievances. It states that the WRC treats submissions as the party’s own, that legal material must be checked, and that an individual may be asked to clarify what has been submitted. Disclosure of AI assistance is encouraged where appropriate, but it is not a universal mandatory declaration.

Investigate the event, not the legal labels

The practical danger is that HR begins investigating a document rather than an event. An AI tool can supply allegations, remedies and statutory labels which were never part of the employee’s original account. Before fixing the terms of reference, the employer should bring the discussion back to the underlying conduct.

Consider an employee who complains that their manager spoke aggressively during a performance meeting. After consulting an AI tool, the employee submits a formal grievance alleging bullying, discrimination, victimisation, psychological injury and breaches of several statutory obligations. The original concern may involve a single conversation.

Should every legal label trigger a separate investigation? We do not think so. The employer should ask what occurred, who may have witnessed it, and which alleged treatment warrants inquiry. The label alone cannot determine the investigation’s scope.

Under the Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures, S.I. No. 146/2000, employee grievances must be “fairly examined and processed”. Fair examination does not mean accepting every assertion without clarification. Nor does it require the employer to adopt the legal characterisation chosen by an AI system. An employer should be prepared to say:

Please identify the incidents about which you complain, the conduct you say occurred and the witnesses or records which may assist. We will then identify the matters requiring investigation.

Require the employee to stand over the factual case

Grievance procedures should allow the employer, before commissioning a formal investigation, to request a short schedule of material allegations for the employee to confirm. This is a case-management measure for complaints which lack particularity, not an additional hurdle in every grievance.

The employee should identify what they witnessed, what they were told by others and what they have inferred. Where the document advances discrimination or other legal conclusions, the employer can ask which events are said to support them. The employee should also be free to correct any assertion generated by a drafting tool which they do not adopt. The employee need not possess legal expertise or forgo representation, interpretation or drafting assistance. The question is whether they understand and adopt the material allegations put forward in their name.

There is a real difference between saying, ‘My manager excluded me from a meeting because I was pregnant’, and submitting a sweeping allegation of systemic discrimination without being able to identify the conduct concerned. The first calls for inquiry. The second may first require particulars.

An employer need not commission a full inquiry into an assertion which remains unparticularised after reasonable requests for clarification. It should record that decision and the reasons for it, while continuing to address any identifiable discrimination, safety or protected-disclosure concern. Appropriate assistance and accommodations must be available during clarification.

The courts are insisting on a witness’s own evidence

Since 1 September 2026, High Court Practice Direction HC 142 (paragraphs 25–28) has required, unless the Court otherwise directs, a declaration in an opening paragraph of affidavits and witness statements intended to stand as evidence. Paragraph 27 requires the witness to confirm that generative AI was not used to generate the substantive evidence and that the document reflects the witness’s own knowledge and recollection. Paragraph 28 permits administrative assistance, including formatting and spell-checking.

Court of Appeal Practice Direction CA 16 adopts corresponding requirements. Circuit Court Practice Direction CC 34, in force since 21 September 2026, takes a different approach: paragraph 2 says substantive generative AI should not be used to prepare affidavits, statements of facts or evidence, apart from ancillary purposes. None of these directions governs an internal workplace grievance. Their common concern is that factual evidence remain attributable to the person advancing it.

There is no proposal here to turn an internal grievance into a sworn affidavit. The better course is to borrow the discipline behind the courts’ approach. Employers should be able, where appropriate, to ask employees to confirm the facts they advance, distinguish personal knowledge from second-hand information and identify substantive AI drafting assistance. A short declaration could read:

“I confirm that I have read this grievance and that it records the factual concerns I wish to raise. Facts stated as within my own knowledge are accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have identified matters based on information received from others or about which I am uncertain. I [have / have not] used generative AI to assist with the substantive preparation of this grievance. Where AI was used, I have reviewed the document and confirm that I adopt the factual allegations made in my name.”

Refusal to sign should not automatically defeat a grievance. Nor should the declaration be treated as an empty formality. Where an employee has had a fair opportunity to explain or correct the account, an unexplained refusal to adopt material allegations may properly affect the weight attached to them. The investigator should record the reasons, consider independent evidence and allow for any relevant accommodation.

When the declaration proves inaccurate

A declaration serves a purpose only if it can be tested. Where an employee denies substantive AI assistance or adopts factual assertions later shown to be invented, the employer is entitled to put the discrepancy to them. A knowingly false declaration may affect the credibility of the account and raise a separate issue under the employer’s conduct rules.

Suspicion is a reason to enquire, not a finding of dishonesty. AI may have assisted with drafting even where the employee has a sound complaint. The question is what was materially inaccurate, what the employee knew and what remains to be investigated. Part 2 considers when separate disciplinary action may follow.

SPOTLIGHT | Build factual authentication into the procedure

The employer should preserve the grievance as submitted and then:

• set out the material factual allegations in a short schedule;
• distinguish first-hand knowledge from reports by others and inference; and
• obtain a signed or otherwise recorded confirmation of the account the employee adopts.

Retain that schedule, the employee’s corrections and the reasons for the investigation’s scope. If the account later changes, the record gives the employer a proper basis for testing credibility. It is considerably more useful than speculating about whether the prose ‘sounds like AI’.

Part 2, ‘Shadow AI and workplace grievances: when can employers take disciplinary action?’, is now available. It considers what employers may prohibit, and when unauthorised disclosure, a false declaration or deliberately obstructive conduct can justify action under disciplinary procedures.

Alastair Purdy LLP advises employers on grievances, investigations, protected disclosures and the fair enforcement of workplace AI and information-security rules.

The post AI-generated grievances: who is really making the allegation? appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

The Data Protection Commission’s Annual Report 2025 (published 30 June 2026),  records 16,160 new cases during 2025 — a 45% increase on the previous year. The DPC received 1,280 complaints solely related to the right of access, which it says accounted for 42% of all complaints received during the year. It also observed that many access complaints arise when the employment relationship is already deteriorating.

The figures matter. The more useful guidance for employers, however, appears in the DPC’s Case Studies 2025 (published 30 June 2026). They show how ordinary workplace records — appraisals, emails, witness material, sick certificates, CCTV and HR correspondence — can become central to a data subject access request (“DSAR”). Three themes recur: context matters, blanket exemptions are difficult to sustain and the quality of the response depends on the employer’s data practices before the request arrives.

Access is to personal data, but context matters

Article 15 GDPR gives an employee three related rights: confirmation that their personal data are being processed, access to those data and prescribed information about the processing. A DSAR is therefore not a general right to every document that mentions the employee.

Legislative wording — Article 15(3) and (4) GDPR

“The controller shall provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing.” The right “shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.”

That distinction should not be applied mechanically. In F.F. v Österreichische Datenschutzbehörde and CRIF GmbH, Case C-487/21, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that the copy must be a faithful and intelligible reproduction of the personal data. An extract, a full document or a database record may be required where the context is essential to understanding the data and exercising GDPR rights.

The DPC applied that principle in Case Studies 2025, Case Study 2. A pastoral centre held a counselling record containing the personal data of the requester and another person. It withheld the record in full because the material was inextricably linked. The DPC did not accept that mixed personal data justified an all-or-nothing response. The centre was required to provide an intelligible copy of the requester’s personal data, using proportionate redaction to protect the other person.

The practical question is whether the response allows the employee to understand the personal data, its context and how it has been used. A schedule may be enough in one case. In another, the relevant email chain, appraisal form, investigation note or CCTV clip may need to be supplied, subject to justified redaction.

Managerial opinions are likely to be personal data

Case Studies 2025, Case Study 4,  concerned a former employee of an Education and Training Board. The employer had responded to the DSAR but redacted one document and withheld two others. The disputed material contained managers’ views about the former employee’s work performance. The employer relied on Article 15(4) GDPR and section 60(3)(b) of the Data Protection Act 2018, arguing that the opinions had been given in confidence.

Legislative wording — section 60(3)(b)

The restriction concerns “an expression of opinion about the data subject by another person given in confidence or on the understanding that it would be treated as confidential”.

The full provision also requires the opinion to have been communicated to a person with a legitimate interest in receiving it. The DPC treated the confidentiality threshold as a high one. These were not comments supplied by a confidential external source or a colleague promised anonymity in exceptional circumstances. They were assessments made by managers as part of their ordinary role. The DPC’s position was direct: managers should ordinarily be able to stand over views expressed about an employee’s performance. It recommended release of the personal data.

That conclusion reflects the broad meaning of personal data. In Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-434/16, the CJEU held that examination answers and an examiner’s comments could both be the candidate’s personal data. Information may relate to a person because of its content, purpose or effect. It does not fall outside the GDPR merely because it is subjective, evaluative or disputed.

Employers should therefore assume that appraisal scores, capability assessments, promotion comments, interview notes, investigation findings and management conclusions may be accessible personal data where they relate to an identifiable employee. The answer is not to stop managers recording candid views, but to ensure comments are evidence-based, relevant, accurately attributed and written on the basis that the employee may later read them.

Disagreement does not automatically require rectification

Access and rectification are separate rights. An employee may strongly disagree with a performance opinion, but disagreement alone does not necessarily make the record inaccurate under Article 16 GDPR.

Case Studies 2025, Case Study 21 concerned clinical rather than employment data. The requester disputed professional views in a medical file and sought rectification. The DPC distinguished an incorrect fact from a genuine professional opinion recorded at a particular time. A factually incorrect entry should be corrected. An opinion does not become inaccurate merely because the individual disputes it; a supplementary statement may instead record the individual’s position without rewriting the historical record.

The same care is required in the employment context. An employer should correct an incorrect date, score, job title or attribution and test whether the facts underlying an opinion are accurate. Where the opinion was genuinely held and accurately recorded, linking the employee’s response to the original record may be more appropriate than altering the history of the file. Any refusal to amend must still be explained within the Article 12 framework.

Confidentiality is not a complete answer

Workplace DSARs often involve mixed data: the requester’s personal data, another person’s data and material that is not personal data at all. Article 15(4) requires a concrete assessment of any adverse effect on the rights and freedoms of others. It does not create an automatic exemption for witness statements, managers’ names or documents labelled confidential.

The DPC’s case studies show what a defensible assessment looks like:

• In Case Study 1, a national school relied on Article 15(4) to redact third-party data and separately claimed legal privilege over specified material. The DPC reviewed the unredacted records and the school’s balancing exercise before accepting the restrictions. The school could connect each restriction to particular content and a particular legal basis.
• In Case Study 2, the pastoral centre moved from complete withholding to an intelligible, redacted disclosure. The other person’s rights were protected without extinguishing the requester’s right of access.
• In Case Study 8, an employer separated the requester’s personal data from third-party and non-personal material. The DPC accepted the redactions on the facts. Redaction is not objectionable in itself; unexplained or indiscriminate redaction is.

The EDPB’s Guidelines 01/2022 on the right of access set out the practical method. The employer should identify the specific right or freedom at risk, assess the likelihood and seriousness of harm, and consider whether redaction, partial disclosure, a summary or another intelligible format can reconcile the competing interests. Withholding an entire record should not be the starting point.

The DPC’s Annual Report 2025 recommends a schedule of redacted or withheld records. The schedule should identify the reason for the decision and the precise GDPR or Data Protection Act provision relied upon. This helps the employee understand the response and creates an audit trail if the DPC later examines it.

Employers should also distinguish external recipients from authorised internal access. RW v Österreichische Post AG, Case C-154/21 confirms that actual external recipients will generally need to be identified, unless they cannot be identified or the request is manifestly unfounded or excessive. J.M. (Pankki S), Case C-579/21 confirms a right to information about the dates and purposes of internal consultations, although staff identities are not automatically disclosable. Reliable audit logs are therefore important.

Privilege and legal claims require separate analysis

Section 162 of the Data Protection Act 2018 protects defined categories of material processed for legal advice or over which a claim to privilege could be made.

Legislative wording — section 162

It covers “personal data processed for the purpose of seeking, receiving or giving legal advice” and data over which “a claim of privilege could be made”.

Privilege and confidentiality are different. Copying a solicitor into an email does not, by itself, make it privileged. Nor does an internal investigation record become privileged merely because litigation is possible. The employer should examine the purpose and circumstances in which each record was created.

Section 60(3)(a)(iv) may separately restrict rights where personal data are processed in contemplation of, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of, an actual or prospective legal claim or proceedings, provided the restriction is necessary and proportionate. It should not be treated as a litigation-wide exclusion. The employer should identify the particular prejudice, apply the restriction only so far as necessary and record that analysis.

A broad or tactical request is usually still a request

Case Studies 2025, Case Study 3 concerned a small organisation faced with a broad request. It refused the DSAR as manifestly unfounded and excessive, principally because locating and reviewing the material would require substantial resources. The DPC did not accept that the burden, without more, met the high threshold in Article 12(5). The organisation ultimately engaged with the requester, agreed a more focused scope and supplied material in batches.

The employee’s motive will also usually be irrelevant. In FT v DW, Case C-307/22, the CJEU confirmed that the first copy had to be provided free of charge even though the requester’s purpose did not reflect the reasons described in Recital 63 GDPR. An employer should not reject a request merely because it appears designed to obtain material for a grievance, Workplace Relations Commission claim or civil proceedings.

There is, however, a narrow exception for abuse. In Brillen Rottler GmbH & Co. KG v TC, Case C-526/24, the CJEU confirmed in March 2026 that even a first request may be “excessive” under Article 12(5) where the controller demonstrates, in light of all the circumstances, that it was made with an abusive intention — for example, to manufacture the conditions for obtaining an advantage under the GDPR. Public information showing a pattern of requests followed by compensation claims may be considered. This remains a restrictive and evidence-dependent exception; a litigation-related motive alone does not establish abuse.

Where the employer processes a large quantity of data, it may invite the employee to identify the information or processing activities sought. The employer should describe the relevant data contexts — HR, payroll, performance, investigations, IT logs and CCTV, for example — so that the employee can make an informed choice. Clarification should not be used to reduce the scope unilaterally or, by itself, to stop the statutory clock.

Search where the data actually live

The EDPB Guidelines require controllers to search relevant IT systems and non-IT files using the identifiers by which information is structured. A name search alone may miss payroll numbers, email addresses, usernames, device IDs and records held under a job title. The DPC’s findings from the EDPB’s 2024 coordinated action likewise found that structured practices, workflow tools, search checklists and effective records of processing activities produced better results.

For an employee DSAR, the search plan may need to cover:

• HR, payroll, absence, recruitment, performance and promotion systems;
• email, approved messaging channels, shared drives and relevant managers’ files;
• access-control, device, telephone, audit, CCTV and vehicle-tracking records, where within scope; and
• processors such as payroll providers, HR platforms and outsourced service desks.

The search should be reasonable and defensible. Employers should record the custodians, systems, date ranges, search terms, exclusions and validation checks used. They need not recreate data lawfully and permanently deleted before the request.

In the Microsoft case reported in the Annual Report 2025, relevant data were deleted after the access request. The DPC’s concern was not that every request imposes indefinite retention. It was that deletion during the response process, in circumstances where the applicable process had not been explained clearly and fairly, undermined the handling of the right. Employers should therefore consider a focused preservation step when the DSAR is logged and document any routine deletion that continues.

Requests can arrive anywhere

A valid DSAR does not require a prescribed form or the words “subject access request”. The controller must recognise the substance of the communication.

The DPC’s decision concerned an access request sent to a legitimate customer-support address. The DPC concluded that a controller must be able to identify and route a valid request received through an ordinary operational channel: Annual Report 2025. The same failure appeared in Case Studies 2025, Case Study 36, where a request submitted through a general support channel was not classified as a GDPR request and was not progressed correctly.

An employer cannot solve that problem by naming one privacy inbox in a policy. HR, managers, reception, IT support and employee-relations teams should know how to identify and escalate a request for personal data. Contractors operating relevant channels need the same instruction. In the Vodafone matter, requests received by a service provider were not passed to and actioned by Vodafone. The reprimand reflected a failure of organisational arrangements, not simply an isolated inbox error.

Under Article 12(3) GDPR, the employer must respond without undue delay and, at the latest, within one calendar month. A further two months may be used where necessary because of complexity or the number of requests, but the employee must be told of the extension and the reasons within the first month. An extension should not be the default.

Identity checks must also be proportionate. Case Studies 2025, Case Study 13,  confirms that stronger verification may be justified where the request concerns particularly sensitive data and disclosure to the wrong person would have serious consequences. However, Article 12(6) permits additional information only where there are reasonable doubts about identity. An employer already communicating with an employee through an authenticated HR portal or established work account should not routinely demand certified identification.

Control how employee data are collected, used and shared

Several of the DPC’s 2025 case studies concern the employer’s underlying handling of personal data rather than the mechanics of a DSAR. Together, they show that an employer should be able to explain what it collected, why a particular person received it, whether a later use was compatible with the original purpose, and what controls applied when data left an approved system.

• Sick certificates and health data: In Case Study 15, the organisation’s sickness-absence arrangements did not make clear what medical information employees should provide or who would receive it. Sick certificates containing health data were copied to a member of the finance team, although finance needed only absence dates. The organisation completed a data protection impact assessment and revised the process. Employers should route certificates only to the appropriate function and give payroll or finance the minimum information needed for pay administration.
• Communications after termination: Case Study 18 concerned a former employee whose employer told residents that the person had been dismissed. The employer could not identify an Article 6 lawful basis and accepted that a neutral departure notice would have met the operational need. This engages both lawfulness under Article 6 and data minimisation under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. Colleagues, clients or service users may need to know that an employee has left and whom to contact instead; they do not ordinarily need to know whether the departure followed a resignation, dismissal, disciplinary process or settlement.
• CCTV access requests: In Case Study 32, a controller directed an individual seeking CCTV footage to An Garda Síochána. The DPC made clear that this did not discharge the controller’s Article 15 obligations. Even where Gardaí are investigating an incident or hold a copy, the controller must deal with the request and either disclose the requester’s personal data or identify and explain a lawful restriction.
• Access to workplace CCTV: Case Study 35 arose from employees’ concerns about a live monitor visible to staff and remote access that had not been properly defined. Access to a live feed is itself processing. An employer should specify who may view the feed or recordings, for what purpose and in what circumstances, and prevent casual viewing by staff with no operational need.
• Using footage for a new purpose: The DPC reprimanded the Irish Prison Service after security CCTV was used to examine an employee’s movements in a disciplinary context. The employer failed to demonstrate a lawful basis or why the use was necessary and proportionate, particularly where the employee had admitted the issue being investigated. Security cameras do not become a general management tool simply because footage is available. Employers should define any disciplinary use in advance and apply strict access and retention controls. The DPC’s CCTV guidance and the EDPB’s Guidelines 3/2019 should inform that assessment.
• External AI tools: Case Study 28 concerned an employee who uploaded 32 candidate CVs to a free AI tool. The employer had no data-processing agreement with the provider and no policy governing external AI services. Employers should identify approved tools, prohibit the use of candidate or employee data in unapproved services, and train staff accordingly. Otherwise, the organisation may not know where the data are when it later needs to secure, delete or disclose them.

A defensible employer workflow

A sound process is easier to defend and less likely to miss data. Employers should test the following steps before a contentious request arrives:

• Recognise and log immediately: Record the date, channel, requester, scope and statutory deadline. Allocate responsibility and acknowledge receipt.
• Confirm identity and authority proportionately: Ask only for information needed to resolve a reasonable doubt. Verify representatives before disclosing data.
• Map and preserve the data: Use the record of processing activities, retention schedule and system owners. Notify processors promptly and consider a focused preservation step.
• Clarify where useful, but keep working: Give the employee a meaningful list of data contexts. Do not treat silence as withdrawal of a valid general request.
• Search and validate: Document the systems, custodians, terms and date ranges used. Check likely gaps rather than relying on a single name search.
• Review each restriction separately: Distinguish personal data, necessary context, third-party rights and privileged material. Record the balancing decision.
• Respond intelligibly and securely: Provide the Article 15 information and personal data in an accessible format. Include a redaction or withholding schedule and complete a second-person quality check before release.

The practical point

The strongest DSAR response is prepared before the request arrives. Employers that know where employee data are held, control who can use them and require managers to write defensible records will be better placed to respond accurately and on time.

The DPC’s 2025 material also closes off several easy assumptions:

• A managerial opinion can be personal data.
• Confidentiality needs evidence.
• Third-party rights require a case-specific balance.
• A litigation-adjacent motive does not invalidate the request.

In practice, the response will be only as good as the organisation’s existing data governance.

AP LLP advises employers on workplace data governance, employee DSARs and the interaction between data protection, investigations, performance management and employment disputes.

This article was written by Robin Hyde (Partner) and Stephen Barry (Trainee).

Key sources

• Data Protection Commission, Annual Report 2025 (published 30 June 2026)
• Data Protection Commission, Case Studies 2025 (published 30 June 2026)
• Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation)
• Data Protection Act 2018
• EDPB, Guidelines 01/2022 on data subject rights — Right of access, version 2.1
• DPC, Subject Access Requests: A Data Controller’s Guide

The post Employee DSARs: What the DPC’s 2025 Material Means for Employers appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

On 13 July 2026, the Department of Justice introduced interim measures in response to the significant volume of applications for the renewal of Irish Residence Permits (“IRPs”) being processed through the Immigration Service portals.

The Department has noted that the Immigration Service Registration Office is currently experiencing exceptionally high volumes of IRP renewal applications. As a result, processing times for some categories may exceed 17 weeks.  In addition, once a renewal application has been approved, it may take a further two weeks for the new IRP card to be delivered.

These interim measures will apply from 13 July 2026 until 31 August 2026.  Previously, IRP holders benefited from a 12-week grace period while awaiting renewal of their registration (information available here). The new interim measures expand upon those arrangements and apply to all expired IRP cards, regardless of the length of time that has elapsed since expiry, subject to certain conditions.

To avail of these interim measures, an individual must satisfy the following requirements:

• They applied to renew their IRP before it expired.
• They have submitted all required documentation and hold a valid employment permit (where needed i.e. Stamp 1).
• They can provide proof that they applied to renew their registration, such as the online application receipt showing the date of application and the unique OREG number.

Applicants can check the status of their application through the online portal, which is updated by the Department every Monday.

Once a renewal application has been approved, a confirmation email is sent to the applicant. This email may be used as proof of registration while the applicant awaits delivery of their physical IRP card.  Importantly, these temporary arrangements do not apply where an individual submitted a renewal application only after their immigration permission had expired.

Travel Concession for Expired IRP Holders

In response to concerns regarding international travel during renewal processing delays, the Department of Justice has issued a Travel Confirmation Notice for IRP holders travelling between 13 July 2026 and 31 August 2026.

Under this arrangement, individuals with expired IRP cards may continue to use their expired card for re-entry to Ireland, provided that they have submitted their renewal application before their IRP expired.

Travellers relying on this concession should carry:

• Their expired IRP card.
• Proof of their renewal application, including the OREG number.
• A copy of the Department of Justice Travel Confirmation Notice (please see here)

Individuals who applied for renewal after their immigration permission had expired are not covered by the travel concession.

What Employers Need to Know

Employers should be aware that eligible employees with expired IRP cards may continue to work legally in Ireland under these temporary arrangements until 31 August 2026.  Employers should ensure that employees can provide:

• Evidence of their IRP renewal application,
• Proof that the renewal application was submitted before the IRP expiry date,
• A valid employment permit, where applicable.

Employers should also note that these interim measures will expire on 31 August 2026. Following that date, the standard 12-week grace period arrangements will apply.

These interim measures provide welcome certainty for both employees and employers while the Department of Justice works to reduce the current backlog in IRP renewal applications.

This article was prepared by Gloria Malandra.

The post Interim Measures Introduced For IRP Holders appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

The firm was named Connacht/Ulster Law Firm of the Year and Connacht/Ulster Employment Law Firm/Team/Lawyer of the Year.

The two awards recognise the firm’s work across its practice and its specialist employment law offering. They follow the firm’s recognition as National Employment Law Firm of the Year in 2025.

We would like to thank our clients for their continued support and our colleagues for the commitment and professionalism they bring to their work.

Further details and the complete list of winners are available on the Irish Law Awards website.

The post Alastair Purdy LLP Wins Two Awards at the Irish Law Awards 2026 appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

His presentation, “The First 24 Hours and Thereafter: Managing the Legal, Human and Commercial Fallout of a Fatal Accident on Site”, considered the decisions facing employers and construction businesses following a fatal workplace incident. Donald examined the immediate response and the practical implications of a subsequent Health and Safety Authority investigation and court process.

A central message was the importance of preparation. Effective, site-specific safety systems, clear incident procedures and documented implementation are essential long before an accident occurs. As Donald observed during the session:

“If a fatality occurs, you don’t get to start at zero — you start with what you’ve already built.”

The presentation emphasised that an organisation’s ability to respond to a serious incident depends not only on the procedures it has written, but also on whether those procedures operate effectively in practice. This requires businesses to consider the legal, human and commercial consequences together.

The summit brought together construction industry leaders and safety professionals under the theme “Beyond Compliance: Building a Culture of Care”, with discussions focused on practical approaches to preventing harm and improving workplace safety.

AP LLP thanks the Construction Industry Federation, Business Post Experiences and event chair Claire Brock for the invitation and the organisation of the summit. The full 2026 summit agenda is available online.

The post Donald McGann Speaks at CIF Health & Safety Summit 2026 appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.