The background to the case is that the Complainant was made redundant in questionable circumstances. At the hearing of her Unfair Dismissals case the Respondent company conceded that the dismissal was unfair, as such the only matter to be determined by the Adjudication Officer (“AO”) was the remedy and having determined that the most appropriate course was one of compensation, he then moved to set out the amount due to the Complainant under various headings of loss. The determination is lengthy and runs to several pages and it is difficult to accurately refer to the location of the extracts from the determination as the paragraphs and pages are not numbered[3]. However, in determining what constituted remuneration, the AO had to deal with various aspects of the Complainant’s remuneration.

The Complainant’s remuneration package at the date her employment was terminated was comprised of the following: –

1. Basic Pay – €275,000.
2. Employer Pension Contribution – €13,750.
3. Health Insurance – €1,776.
4. Mobile phone – €240.
5. Restricted Stock Units – unfortunately the decision makes no mention of the amount of these and those that were vested and unvested.
6. Discretionary Cash Bonus – On 7 March 2024, in addition to her base annual salary, the Complainant was awarded a discretionary cash bonus payment of €108,075 out of a maximum of €165,000 (being 60% of her bonus eligible salary).

The Complainant was successful in obtaining alternative employment at a greater salary some 25 weeks and four days post the date of termination therefore loss was limited to this period.

Basic Pay

In determining what constituted remuneration for the purpose of the Act the AO found that it amounted to a weekly figure of €5,591.65 (€290,766 per annum), which included “the Complainant’s annual salary, the employer pension contribution, her private health cover and mobile phone expenses”. No issue can be taken with this rationale as pension contributions and health insurance have long been determined to be remuneration.

However, the AO in assessing the complainant’s overall loss at €142,984, calculated same based on gross figures. With respect, this is where the AO has fallen into an error of law. Financial loss under the Act is defined as: –

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation.

As set out in my previous paper to the IRN on this issue, the Employment Appeals Tribunal had long held that loss should be calculated on net weekly pay[4]. Given the decision in the within case, the AO awarded the Complainant approximately 52% more than was appropriate or some €74,351.68.

There is then the separate issue of when loss began to accrue. The AO held that the dismissal took effect on 8 November 2024 and that financial loss accrued from that date, notwithstanding that the Complainant had been paid eight weeks’ salary in lieu of notice. Even if the AO was correct to conclude that the dismissal took effect on that date, it is difficult to see how the Complainant could at the same time be treated as suffering financial loss from that very date when she had already received payment for the next eight weeks. That payment must, at a minimum, impact upon the assessment of actual loss.

Restricted Stock Units (“RSUs”)

Turning to the matter of RSUs, unfortunately we do not have any indication as the terms of the scheme, the amount of RSUs granted and those that were either vested or unvested. Typically, a senior employee is granted a tranche of RSUs in any given year, but they only vest in part on a yearly basis. For example, an employee may be granted 10,000 RSUs at $1.00 each, however the first tranche of 20% may vest one year from the grant date and so forth until the fifth year when they are all fully vested. Once they are vested, the employee is free to sell or retain them. In dealing with this matter, the AO found as follows: –

“The Respondent highlighted that the Complainant’s employer is Lionbridge International Unlimited Company whereas the RSU Agreement is with Lionbridge Technologies LLC, a Delaware limited liability company.

In circumstances where the RSU Agreement is not with the named Respondent, who dismissed the Complainant, I cannot find that RSUs form part of ‘remuneration’ in respect of the instant case. They represent a separate corporate arrangement rather than a benefit provided by the employer who effected the dismissal”.

The WRC’s approach to equity-based remuneration has generally turned on whether the benefit in question is realised and quantifiable or speculative and contingent. In Vice President v Professional, Scientific & Technical[5] and in Gráinne Sherlock v Pluralsight Ireland Ltd[6], the WRC excluded unvested stock options on the grounds that their value was uncertain, dependent on future vesting, and not proven as financial loss. Maria Inmaculada De La Torre Ruiz v Hamilton UK Services Limited[7] reaffirmed this approach in 2025, confirming that unvested stock options or share awards cannot be included as remuneration under the Act.

None of these cases simply rejected the notion out of hand for the reason that they were issued by a different albeit related entity. Indeed, it is common course that most, if not all, stock option and RSU schemes are located in Delaware[8] in the USA and generally are the preserve, as in this instance, of a subsidiary company rather than the employing one. This is not to say that the approach taken in this instant case is incorrect. However, it does generally fly in the face of the accepted jurisprudence in this area. Presumably, in this instance, the Complainant’s offer letter contained an offer of RSUs and presumably they formed part of the annual review of pay and conditions of employment. Generally, they are also used as a retention tool, designed to retain senior executives, due to the prolonged timing of the vesting period. Given all of the foregoing, it is difficult to reconcile how a benefit conferred on an employee cannot be deemed remuneration. Further, there is no analysis in the decision as to who was the employer, who conferred the benefit or indeed any of the foregoing presumptions. More clarity is required in this area and it behoves the WRC to apply consistency in this regard.

Discretionary Cash Bonus

On 7 March 2024, in addition to her base annual salary, the Complainant received a discretionary cash bonus payment of €108,075 out of a maximum of €165,000 (being 60% of her bonus eligible salary or 40% of her base salary). She was dismissed on 8 November 2024. By any calculation, this represented a significant and important part of the Complainant’s remuneration.

The AO’s findings in this regard are particularly interesting, as he found as follows: –

“In considering whether the Complainant’s bonus constitutes ‘remuneration’ as set out in the Act, I have carefully reviewed and considered both the Discretionary Management Bonus Plan as well as the written submissions provided to me by both parties after the hearing. The Respondent asserted that the bonus was discretionary and therefore does not form part of remuneration. The Complainant on the other hand stated that the bonus was an integral and regular component of her earnings and should properly be included.

In considering whether the Complainant’s bonus in this case amounts to ‘remuneration’, I note that although the Act states that ‘remuneration’ includes ‘allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay’, the definition does not remove the clear difference between pay that is fixed and clearly due to an employee, and payments that depend on conditions being met or remain at the employer’s discretion.

A distinction must therefore be drawn between:

• Guaranteed or contractual earnings to which the employee has an enforceable entitlement; and

• Payments which remain contingent upon the exercise of employer discretion.

This distinction was considered by the UK Court of Appeal in Commerzbank AG v Keogh (High Court, 2017), where the Court examined the nature of discretionary bonus schemes and emphasised that the existence of discretion — even where bonuses had historically been paid — does not of itself create an enforceable entitlement. The Court held that where discretion is genuine and not exercised irrationally or capriciously, an expectation of payment does not convert a discretionary scheme into a contractual right.

While I recognise that Commerzbank is a UK case, the reasoning is persuasive. Specifically, it states that:

• Past payment does not extinguish discretion.

• Expectation does not equate to entitlement.

• A bonus subject to operative discretion remains contingent until declared or crystallised.

Applying that reasoning to the definition of ‘remuneration’ in the Act, and having regard to the following points in respect of the instant case, I note that:

• No 2024 bonus had been declared, approved or quantified prior to dismissal.

• The Respondent’s bonus scheme documentation afforded discretion to them.

• The Complainant’s expectation of payment arose from historical practice rather than enforceable right. While that expectation may have been reasonable, it does not create a statutory entitlement.

Accordingly, I find that the Complainant’s discretionary bonus does not meet the definition.”

It is regrettable that we do not have details of the scheme itself. Rather, we are left with the AO’s conclusion that the scheme was discretionary, despite the fact that no consideration appears to have been given to whether it was paid in previous years, whether it represented a payment by custom and practice or the Complainant’s position that the “bonus was an integral and regular part of her earnings”.

Whilst he may have as he put it, “carefully reviewed and considered” the bonus plan, none of the foregoing questions are examined in the decision.

The AO then goes on to draw the distinction between what he deems “Guaranteed or contractual earnings to which the employee has an enforceable entitlement” and payments which remain contingent upon the exercise of employer discretion. In making this determination, he previously concludes that the Act “does not remove the clear difference between pay that is fixed and clearly due to an employee, and payments that depend on conditions being met or remain at the employer’s discretion”. Having done so, he then goes on to state that “this distinction was considered by the UK Court of Appeal in Commerzbank AG v Keogh (High Court, 2017)”.

There are a number of problems with this conclusion.

Firstly, there is no existing statute which provides for such a distinction to be drawn and it is not the role of AOs to infer or draw such distinctions.

Secondly, whilst the AO is correct in stating that the Act itself makes no distinction between fixed pay and pay that is variable dependent on performance or at an employer’s discretion, the Statutory Instrument[9] which sets out how weekly pay is to be calculated does, yet no consideration appears to have been given to this. Indeed, the Statutory Instrument specifically envisages a situation where an employee’s “remuneration includes commissions (being piece rates or commissions related directly to his output at work) or bonuses”[10]. The consideration of bonuses is therefore specifically provided for and given that the bonus payment in 2024 was paid in March, it falls within the 26-week period ending 13 weeks before the date of dismissal, which the statute provides for.

Thirdly, there is no UK Court of Appeal or High Court case of Commerzbank v Keogh (2017). It is difficult therefore to reconcile how the AO determines that its “reasoning is persuasive” when it does not exist. Perhaps the AO meant to cite the 2006 UK Court of Appeal case of Commerzbank AG v Keen[11] which was a case that dealt with a discretionary bonus scheme in a bank. However, the facts of that case are distinguishable from the present in that this case dealt with the question of whether an employee could rely on the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, a UK Act, as a potential remedy for an unreasonable term in a contract of employment. It is not based on statute as any claim for Unfair Dismissal before the WRC is.

All told, it is difficult to discern how the Adjudication Officer arrived at the conclusion that a discretionary bonus did not constitute remuneration, particularly in circumstances where the relevant Statutory Instrument expressly provides for the consideration of bonuses. The reasoning appears to rely on a UK authority which, on examination, does not exist in the form cited. Even allowing for the possibility of a misquotation, the possible case relied on is not relevant to statutory appeals. In those circumstances, the AO clearly fell into an error of law, the consequence being that the Complainant was unjustly deprived of additional, and potentially substantial, compensation.

Statutory Redundancy

In my previous paper on this topic I noted that the treatment of redundancy payments in unfair dismissal awards has been inconsistent. Earlier EAT decisions took conflicting approaches. In Employee v Employer[12] and in Employee v An Employer[13], redundancy payments were either included within or deducted from the unfair-dismissal award. In contrast, Employee v Employer[14] and Employee v Employer[15] held that redundancy and unfair-dismissal payments were separate entitlements, awarding compensation in addition to statutory redundancy lump sums.

In this case, the AO held that having regard to the definition of “financial loss” that he was satisfied that “the statutory redundancy lump sum should not be offset against the Complainant’s compensatory award. It remains a separate statutory entitlement”.

The AO sought to distinguish JVC Europe Ltd v Panisi[16] on the basis that it involved an award at the statutory ceiling of 104 weeks’ remuneration and that it was only in such circumstances, where there was said to be a risk of “double recovery”, that the question of deduction properly arose. With respect, that is not what  was stated in Panisi. In Panisi, Charleton J stated in clear terms: “As there was no redundancy, but as there was a dismissal, Mr. Panisi has now no entitlement to the redundancy money or the ex gratia payment.” The judgment does not state that redundancy monies fall to be deducted only where the award would otherwise exceed 104 weeks. That qualification appears to have been added by the AO rather than drawn from the authority itself.

There is also a conceptual difficulty in the AO’s reliance on “double recovery”. Double recovery is not confined to cases where the statutory maximum would otherwise be exceeded. It concerns recovery twice for the same loss. The 104-week cap is a statutory ceiling on compensation; it is not a test for whether double recovery arises. The two concepts are distinct, yet they appear to have been treated as though they were one and the same.

There is then the further difficulty that, having found that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed rather than genuinely made redundant, it is hard to see how the statutory redundancy payment can simply be treated as irrelevant to the assessment of loss on the basis that it is a “separate statutory entitlement”. If there was no redundancy in substance, the fact that the monies were paid under another Act does not mean that such monies are irrelevant when calculating what loss was in fact suffered.

Further, in Kaye McDonnell v Sodexo[17], the same AO treated the ex gratia element of a termination package as affecting the unfair dismissal award, while leaving the statutory redundancy element untouched. He held:

“Given the ex-gratia payment she received, which included an amount in excess of her statutory entitlements, and in the absence of any documentation to demonstrate that she was looking for work between the date of termination with the Respondent and when she found her new role, I do not make any award for the period from September 2020 to July 2021.”

The difficulty is that no clear statutory basis is identified for taking the ex gratia payment into account while not treating the statutory redundancy payment in the same way. That distinction is not explained. Nor, in McDonnell, did the AO seek to justify that position by reference to any 104-week ceiling or any supposed issue of double recovery arising only at the statutory maximum. That tends to undermine the reasoning advanced in O’Connell, where the non-deduction of statutory redundancy was linked to the fact that the award did not approach the 104-week cap.

Conclusion

The decision in O’Connell v Lionbridge illustrates, yet again, the absence of a coherent and principled framework governing the assessment of compensation under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977. On any objective analysis, the determination raises fundamental concerns: the calculation of loss on a gross rather than net basis, the treatment of loss as accruing from the date of dismissal notwithstanding eight weeks’ pay in lieu of notice, the exclusion of equity-based remuneration on questionable grounds, the treatment of discretionary bonus absent proper statutory analysis, the reliance on a non-existent case and the inconsistent approach to statutory redundancy.

Each of these issues, taken individually, is problematic; taken together, they underscore a system that lacks predictability.

For practitioners, employers, and employees alike, the difficulty is not merely academic. The absence of consistency produces materially divergent outcomes on similar facts, undermining confidence in the adjudicative process. Where statutory instruments expressly address elements, such as bonuses, where payments in lieu of notice plainly bear on actual loss, and where long-standing jurisprudence has settled issues such as net versus gross loss, departures from those principles, without clear reasoning, amount to errors of law rather than mere differences of interpretation.

Ultimately, the difficulty lies, not solely with individual adjudication officers, but with the broader legislative and jurisprudential landscape. The governing statutory instrument is outdated, appellate guidance is limited and, again, contradictory and first-instance decisions frequently diverge without reconciliation. In those circumstances, it is unsurprising that inconsistent approaches persist.

What is now required is clear appellate clarification, as a start from the Labour Court, but it would be very helpful if it came from the Superior Courts, on the core components of compensation: the proper basis for calculating financial loss, the treatment of variable and equity-based remuneration and the interaction between statutory redundancy and financial loss. Absent such guidance, inconsistency will continue to prevail, to the detriment of legal certainty and fairness in the administration of employment law.

Alastair Purdy SC.

[1] See Industrial Relations News, IRN 42, 20 November 2025

[2] ADJ-00057077 – 1^st March 2026

[3] See criticism of the approach of the Labour Court in their determinations by Bolger J. in Hanley v PBR Restaurants Ltd (Trading as Fish Shack Café) [2025] IEHC 224 and Charpentier v Verizon Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 628

[4] Based on an approximate net marginal tax rate for a higher earner

[5] ADJ-00020363 [2019]

[6] ADJ-00044941 [2024]

[7] ADJ-00049851 [2025]

[8] There are various reasons for this, including judicial expertise and the fact that Delaware law allows companies to issue multiple classes of stock, but Delaware also does not does not require companies to publicly list directors, officers, or shareholders in annual filings. This confidentiality protects sensitive information regarding company leadership and compensation structure.

[9] S.I. No. 287/1977 – Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations, 1977

[10] S.I No.287/1977 – Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations 1977 s 7(b)

[11] [2006] EWCA Civ 1536

[12] (UD787/2007)

[13] (UD1880/09)

[14] (UD1848/2010)

[15] (UD1321/2012)

[16] [2011] IEHC 279

[17] ADJ-00032098 [2022]

The post The Elusive Measure of Loss: Compensation and Coherence After O’Connell v Lionbridge appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

A Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment (DETE) update indicates the Act is expected to commence during 2026.

Purpose of the Act

The Act will allow, but not compel, an employee to remain in employment until the state pension age of 66 which will assist in bridging the income gap for employees retired before they are eligible for the state pension, as many private sector employers rely on a contractual retirement age often below the pensionable age of 66.

Irish law currently permits mandatory retirement ages provided they are objectively justified under the Employment Equality Acts 1998 (as amended). The Act introduces a specific statutory right and process for employees who do not consent to retire before they are eligible for state pension, providing employees with an additional avenue of complaint and redress beyond an equality claim.

Who will be covered?

Once commenced, the Act will apply where:

• the employee’s contract specifies a contractual retirement age below pensionable age; and
• the employee has completed a probationary period (if applicable).

The “non-consent” notification right: the core change

If an employee does not consent to retire at the contractual retirement age (below 66), they must notify the employer in writing:

• not less than 3 months and not more than 1 year before the contractual retirement date; or
• where the contract requires a longer notice period, not less than the employer notice period or 6 months, whichever is shorter.

(The Act limits the frequency of such notices to no more than twice in any 6‑month period).

Once a valid notice is issued to the employer:

• the employer must not enforce the contractual retirement age before providing a reasoned written reply within one month (failure to do so without reasonable constitutes a criminal offence); and
• the employer must not enforce the retirement age, before either:
  • the date the employee consents to; or
  • the date the employee reaches pensionable age,
    whichever happens first.

Simply put, where the retirement age is below 66, the default position becomes: the employee stays (up to 66) unless the employer can objectively justify enforcing retirement at the earlier age.

Practical point for HR: your current retirement “runway” communications and timetable (often 6–12 months out) will need to align with these statutory timelines and the new one-month employer response obligation.

Can employers still enforce a retirement age below 66?

The Act preserves the concept of objective justification to uphold a retirement age, but only if the employer can demonstrate that:

• the retirement is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, and
• the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

The “reasoned written reply” obligation (and a new criminal offence)

If the employer proposes to enforce the contractual retirement age despite the employee’s non-consent notice, the employer must provide a reasoned written reply within one month setting out the justification.

Failure (without reasonable cause) to provide that reply is a criminal offence, exposing the employer (and, in certain cases, relevant officers of a corporate employer) to prosecution, with penalties including a class A fine and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment on summary conviction.

Legitimate aims: evidence beats assumptions

The WRC’s Code of Practice on Longer Working remains a key practical reference point as it provides examples of potentially legitimate aims such as succession planning, intergenerational fairness, health and safety in safety‑critical roles, and maintaining a balanced age structure – while emphasising that retirement decisions require careful handling and objective justification.

The importance of substantiating such aims was shown in the WRC’s landmark decision published in December 2025, which upheld Eircom Limited’s (trading as Eir) right to enforce a mandatory retirement age of 65 where evidence was presented at the hearing to show that 60% of Eir’s field technicians were over 60. The company used this figure to rationalise the argument that in the absence of a fixed retirement age, it would be impossible to plan the hiring of apprentices to replace the aging workforce.

HR reality check: “workforce planning” as a label and vague justifications are not enough. Employers should expect to show role-specific reasoning, and why less intrusive alternatives would not achieve the stated aim.

The Act further points to a high burden on employers to justify the contractual retirement age in relation to the “the employee concerned”. An inference can therefore be drawn there that individual assessment by an employer appears to be necessary, which is contrary to the recent supreme court authority of Mallon v The Minister for Justice and others which determined that an individual assessment was not required to justify a mandatory retirement age under Employment Equality Acts.

Remedies

The WRC route is engaged once an employee has validly notified the employer that they do not consent to retire at a contractual retirement age below pensionable age.

From that point onwards, the Act imposes strict statutory obligations on the employer. A failure to comply with those obligations constitutes a stand-alone breach, regardless of whether the employer might otherwise have an arguable age-based justification.

In summary, the WRC-enforceable breaches under the Act fall into three clear categories:

• Procedural breaches following employee notification: Enforcing or progressing a retirement at the contractual age after a valid non-consent notification, without first complying with the statutory process (including delaying or bypassing engagement, setting a retirement date without consent, or acting before pensionable age).
• Substantive justification failures: Enforcing a contractual retirement age below pensionable age without being able to demonstrate a legitimate aim and that retirement at that age is appropriate and necessary, supported by evidence and consideration of less intrusive alternatives.

Process and treatment breaches: Failing to issue a timely, reasoned written reply within one month where enforcement is proposed, and/or penalising or disadvantaging an employee because they exercised their statutory right to refuse consent to retire (note that the scope of penalisation is broad, encompassing dismissal, demotion, intimidation, withheld training, negative performance assessment, and other detriments).

Where either of the above breaches are found to have occurred, remedies can include:

• a declaration,
• an order to take a specified course of action (including reinstatement or re-engagement), and/or
• compensation up to the greater of 104 weeks’ remuneration or €40,000.

WRC complaints/disputes are generally statute barred after 6 months, with scope (in many cases) to extend up to 12 months where there is “reasonable cause” for delay.

As dual or parallel claims are restricted, where the same conduct gives rise to a complaint under the Employment (Contractual Retirement Ages) Act 2025 and a claim under the Employment Equality Acts (including an age discrimination claim), relief cannot be obtained under both regimes for the same conduct, and the employee must ultimately elect their avenue of recourse.

Key Takeaway

Once commenced, the Act will mean that a contractual retirement age below 66 will not be enforceable by default where an employee notifies that they do not consent to retire. If an organisation intends to maintain a retirement age below State Pension Age, it should implement a clear retirement and longer working workflow aligned to the Act – covering notification handling, internal decision-making, the one-month reasoned reply, and a consistent approach to extensions.

The most effective way to minimise the compliance and litigation risk is to either remove the contractual retirement age if suitable to your business, or, align the contractual retirement age with (or beyond) the State pensionable age. In any scenario, employers should review and stress test their objective justification position, so it is evidence-led, role-specific and capable of being defended if scrutinised.

The post The Employment (Contractual Retirement Ages) Act 2025: What employers need to know (and what to do now) appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

What the Code is (and is not)

The Code provides practical guidance and a “best practice” framework for handling movement between full-time and part-time working (and, importantly, requests to increase hours from part-time). It does not create a statutory right to part-time work: Irish law still does not provide a general entitlement to reduce hours to part-time, and the Code expressly recognises this.

The underlying legal position remains that any change to contracted hours is a matter for agreement, subject to wider statutory constraints (for example, equality and banded-hours rules where relevant).

The legal history – how part-time workers’ rights developed

Ireland’s core protections for part-time employees stem from EU Directive 97/81/EC (the Framework Agreement on part-time work), implemented domestically by the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001. The Act’s central rule is equal treatment: a part-time employee must not be treated less favourably than a comparable full-time employee regarding conditions of employment, unless objectively justified. In parallel, the Act contains an express anti-penalisation protection where an employee invokes rights under the legislation or refuses to move between full-time and part-time at the employer’s request.

The access-to-part-time question has always been slightly different from the equal-treatment question. The 2001 Act protects part-time workers once they are part-time, but it did not introduce a general right to become part-time. That “access” gap was addressed by a statutory Code of Practice first put on a statutory footing in 2006 (S.I. No. 8/2006). The 2026 update refreshes that Code to reflect legislative and institutional changes since 2006.

What the updated Code says employers should do

The Code’s organising idea is that access to part-time work should be considered across the organisation (including skilled and managerial roles) and should be enabled where consistent with business requirements. The practical focus is on employers having:

• clear internal policies, developed in consultation as appropriate;
• objective role-suitability criteria;
• a structured request process with consultation, a timely decision, and an appeal route (as described in more detail below).

It also flags operational topics that commonly drive decisions (service delivery, staffing, administration, cost, continuity, regulatory constraints) and encourages employers to address indirect barriers such as training access, information flows to part-time staff, and career progression impacts.

The biggest “changes” compared with the 2006 Code

In substance, much of the best-practice architecture remains familiar (policy development, objective criteria, consultation, and transparency around reasons for refusal). What is most clearly different is the modern legal and institutional framing.

First, the updated Code is explicitly positioned within the post-2015 WRC framework: it references section 20 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and reflects the WRC’s role, whereas the 2006 instrument is rooted in the Labour Relations Commission and section 42 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990.

Second, the updated Code expressly “updates to reflect legislative changes” and now signposts later statutes and codes that did not exist in 2006 – most notably the banded-hours regime under the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018, the EU Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Regulations 2022, the Work Life Balance and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2023, and the WRC’s 2024 Code of Practice for Employers and Employees Right to Request Flexible Working and Right to Request Remote Working. This matters operationally because many “hours” discussions now sit alongside (or overlap with) separate statutory request/notification frameworks, and the updated Code nudges employers to route matters correctly.

Third, the Government announcement accompanying the update emphasises transparency and labour-market participation objectives (including a stated encouragement to publish gender-balanced take-up data). That is a policy signal employers should expect to see reflected in employee expectations, IR discussions, and – over time – how reasonableness is assessed in disputes.

Process for dealing with requests

Under the recommended process for handling requests, the updated Code envisages a structured pathway rather than ad hoc discussions. Employers are encouraged to implement a procedure that covers four stages: (i) application, (ii) consultation and discussion, (iii) decision and response, and (iv) managing the outcome (either implementation or refusal).

• Application stage: The employee should submit a written request explaining the reasons for the change (for example, a move from full-time to part-time, a move from part-time to full-time, or an increase in hours) and should indicate whether the request is temporary or permanent. The Code also flags that where the request is made under the separate statutory “right to request” flexible or remote working framework, it should be dealt with under that Code instead.
• Consultation and discussion stage: The employer should treat the request seriously, allow a reasonable timeframe for consideration, and consult with the employee about feasibility. The Code indicates both parties should consider factors relevant to the employee and the business, including personal/family needs, the number of employees already working part-time, operational and staffing impacts, resources required to cover work, the urgency and duration of the request, and how the proposed revised hours align with the job’s tasks. It also references interaction points with other legal regimes (for example banded-hours considerations where the contract does not reflect hours worked over the reference period).
• Decision stage: The employer should issue the decision in a timely manner. If approved, the Code recommends agreeing and documenting how the arrangement will operate, typically through a signed written agreement setting out changes to terms such as pay, annual leave, sick leave and pension or other benefits (with pro-rata treatment where appropriate). If refused or deferred, the employer should clearly explain the grounds. The Code expressly contemplates refusal where part-time arrangements would adversely affect the business (for example service delivery impact, staffing difficulties, or other relevant operational factors).
• Appeal stage: Where agreement cannot be reached, the employee should have access to an appeal mechanism, typically through the organisation’s established grievance procedures. From a risk-management standpoint, this should be a genuine review step with a manager not previously involved, and a written outcome confirming the reasons.

Codes of Practice – not “binding”, but still risky to ignore

A Code of Practice does not generally create freestanding legal obligations in the way an Act does. However, non-compliance is not consequence-free. Under section 20(9) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, an approved Code is admissible in evidence in proceedings before a court, the Labour Court or a WRC adjudication officer. The Code itself reiterates that, and that relevant provisions “shall be taken into account” where they relate to a question in the proceedings.

Practically, that means a Code often becomes the benchmark for “reasonable” employer behaviour: fair process, timely engagement, objectively explained outcomes, and non-discriminatory criteria. If an employer departs from the Code, it increases the risk of adverse inferences – particularly where the underlying claim is anchored in binding law (for example, an equality claim, penalisation, or a contractual/unlawful deduction dispute) and the Code is used to test the credibility and reasonableness of the employer’s explanation.

What employers should do next – a compliance-focused action list

Employers should treat this as a policy and process upgrade exercise rather than a one-off announcement.

1. Update policies and templates: Refresh part-time working policies (and any flexible-working suite) so they align with the updated Code’s request/decision/appeal structure and cross-refer the 2024 WRC Code on flexible/remote working where relevant.
2. Build objective, role-based criteria: Document role-suitability criteria for part-time arrangements (service coverage, regulatory requirements, continuity, supervision needs), and ensure they are applied consistently.
3. Standardise the request pathway: Implement a clear form of application, a defined consideration timeframe, a consultation meeting step, a written outcome with reasons (especially for refusals/deferrals), and an appeal route via grievance.
4. Equality-proof decisions: Stress-test refusal reasons for indirect discrimination risk (particularly where requests relate to caring, disability, or other protected grounds) and ensure any less favourable treatment of part-time staff can be objectively justified where needed.
5. Contract and benefits hygiene: Where a request is agreed, issue a written variation capturing hours, pay, annual leave, benefits/pension treatment on a pro-rata basis where applicable, and any review mechanism.
6. Train managers: The Code places real weight on consistent management support and implementation; managers need to understand how to consult, document reasons, and avoid informal “off-the-record” refusals that undermine later defensibility.
7. Consider transparency metrics: If the organisation is likely to publish flexible-working take-up data (as encouraged in the Minister’s announcement), decide now what will be tracked, how privacy will be protected, and how the narrative will be managed internally and externally.

Case Note

McGrath v Net Smart Security Ltd ADJ-00056559 [2025]: Discriminatory Refusal of Part-Time Work

In this case, the employee brought successful complaints under the Employment Equality Act 1998 for discrimination on the gender and family status grounds, arising from the employer’s treatment of her following pregnancy.

After a period of pregnancy-related absence, the employee sought to return to work on a part-time basis. The employer refused the request, stating that part-time working “never took place” within the business. However, evidence showed that part-time arrangements had been facilitated for relatives of the CEO, undermining the credibility of this position.

The WRC found that the Employer failed to meaningfully or objectively assess whether part-time working could be accommodated. This failure was particularly significant given that the employee’s role remained vacant and the employer was experiencing staffing difficulties. The employer was unable to justify why a part-time arrangement could not have been implemented.

The Adjudication Officer held that the employee had established a presumption of discrimination under the Employment Equality Act 1998. As the employer failed to provide credible, evidence-based reasons for refusing the request, it did not discharge the burden of proof.

In awarding redress, the WRC emphasised the requirement for compensation to be effective and dissuasive, awarding €50,000, being the maximum compensation available under the Employment Equality Act, equivalent to two years’ remuneration.

The decision underlines that refusals of part-time or flexible working requests linked following maternity must be supported by objective operational justification, consistent treatment and documented engagement, failing which employers may face significant liability for unlawful discrimination.

The post New WRC Code of Practice on Access to Part-Time Work appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

With MyFutureFund now live, employers can expect automatic enrolment to become a practical payroll issue rather than a future policy change. The scheme commenced on 1 January 2026 and applies to eligible employees who are not already covered by a qualifying pension arrangement through payroll. It is administered by the National Automatic Enrolment Retirement Savings Authority (NAERSA), which will carry out eligibility checks, issue payroll notifications and oversee the collection of employee, employer and State contributions.

UPDATED STATUTORY INSTRUMENT

S.I. No. 668/2025 (Automatic Enrolment Retirement Savings System Regulations (Amendment) (Section 52) Regulations 2025), made on 22 December 2025 and effective from 1 January 2026, introduced minimum standards for when an occupational pension scheme or PRSA can be relied on to claim an exemption from enrolment into MyFutureFund.

The Regulations insert Schedule 1A into the Principal Regulations and provide that these standards apply for the purposes of section 51 of the Automatic Enrolment Retirement Savings System Act 2024 (exempt employments). They are particularly relevant for employers relying on payroll PRSAs or defined contribution schemes to keep roles outside MyFutureFund.

In summary, for defined contribution occupational schemes and PRSAs to be deemed exempt under the 2024 Act, the minimum standards now require

• an employer contribution of at least 1.5% of gross pay or €1,200 per year (whichever is lower); and
• combined employer and employee contributions of at least 3.5% of gross pay or €2,800 per year (whichever is lower).

GUIDANCE: AT A GLANCE

• Who is auto-enrolled: Employees aged 23–60 earning €20,000+ per year across all employments, who are not in exempt employment.
• Rates (2026–2028): Employee 1.5% + Employer 1.5% + State top-up 0.5% (on gross pay up to €80,000).
• Eligibility assessment: NAERSA uses Revenue payroll data; a lookback period of up to 13 weeks may apply for new starters or irregular earnings (no backdated contributions for that period).
• When contributions are due: Contributions must be paid to NAERSA at the same time as the employee is paid (per pay date).
• What is “exempt employment”: A payroll-based qualifying occupational scheme/PRSA/RAC/PEPP that meets the exemption standards (see below for further detail).
• December 2025 exemption standards: Defined contribution schemes/PRSAs through payroll must average at least 3.5% total contributions, including at least 1.5% employer, subject to caps.
• Opt-out / suspension: Opt-out window is months 7–8 after enrolment (and after each rate change); suspension is for 1–2 years after the mandatory 6 months.
• Key compliance risks: Late/withheld contributions and any conduct that hinders participation can lead to enforcement action, fines and potential prosecution.

EMPLOYEE ELIGIBILITY AND NAERSA ASSESSMENT

An employee will be automatically enrolled if they:

• are aged between 23 and 60;
• earn €20,000 or more per annum across all employments; and
• are not in exempt employment (i.e. no qualifying pension contribution through payroll for that employment).

Employees under 23 or over 60, or earning under €20,000, may choose to opt in. NAERSA determines eligibility using Revenue payroll data. Where a clear earnings record exists, enrolment is immediate; otherwise NAERSA can use a lookback period of up to 13 weeks and contributions are not backdated for that period.

Eligibility is assessed across all employments for the €20,000 threshold. If an employee has more than one job, they may be auto-enrolled for any employment where there is no exempt pension coverage through payroll.

EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS (PRACTICAL)

Employers should assume they have obligations in three areas: portal setup, payroll processing, and employee communications.

Portal setup

• Register on the MyFutureFund employer portal and set up a payment method (NAERSA recommends variable direct debit).
• Employer/agent access is via ROS credentials/certificates (no separate portal login).

Payroll processing

• Retrieve and apply the Auto-Enrolment Payroll Notification (AEPN) for each pay run (the AEPN instructs enrolments, opt-outs, suspensions and applicable rates).
• Deduct the employee contribution and calculate the matching employer contribution on gross pay (up to €80,000 per year).
• Pay employee and employer contributions to NAERSA at the same time as the employee is paid.

Employee communications

• Inform employees when they are first enrolled and confirm the enrolment date. NAERSA provides compliant “welcome letters” in the employer portal mailbox.
• Ensure managers do not encourage or pressure employees to opt out or suspend contributions.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND PAYROLL MECHANICS

Rates and earnings cap

Contributions are calculated on gross earnings (including allowances, overtime and commission where included in gross pay). No contributions are levied on gross pay above €80,000 in a calendar year. Where the €80,000 threshold is exceeded within a pay period, contributions may be taken on the full pay for that period and the AEPN will then update for the remainder of the year.

Timing of payment

Contributions must be paid to NAERSA at the same time as the employee is paid. For monthly payrolls, this means the contribution becomes due on each monthly pay date.

Unpaid leave and inactivity

If an employee is on unpaid leave (for example, unpaid sick leave or unpaid maternity leave), contributions are not deducted for the period of unpaid leave. Where an employee opts out or suspends contributions, matching employer contributions cease for that period.

Tax treatment (high level)

Government guidance indicates that employee MyFutureFund contributions do not receive standard pension income tax relief; instead the State provides a top-up (€1 for every €3 contributed by the employee). Employer contributions are intended to be tax-deductible for the employer and not treated as a benefit-in-kind for the employee. Tax treatment at drawdown/retirement is expected to follow broadly similar principles to other supplementary pension arrangements.

How NAERSA will assess exemption and compliance

NAERSA has indicated it will assess contribution levels over a three-month period (the same basis as the earnings assessment for MyFutureFund eligibility). Where contributions fall below the standards, NAERSA expects to contact employers to assist them to become compliant. However, continued non-compliance with no evidence of appropriate steps may lead to enforcement of NAERSA’s compliance powers under the Act.

Practical examples (defined contribution/PRSA)

• Employee contributes 3.5% via payroll; employer contributes 0%. Not exempt (employer minimum of 1.5% not met).
• Employer contributes 3.5% via payroll; employee contributes 0%. Exempt (total >= 3.5% and employer >= 1.5%).
• Employee 2.0% + employer 1.5% via payroll. Exempt (total 3.5% and employer minimum met).
• Employee 1.0% + employer 0.5% via payroll. Not exempt (total < 3.5% and employer < 1.5%).

Important: contributions made outside payroll (for example, an employee paying directly to a PRSA by direct debit) are not visible to NAERSA through Revenue payroll data and will not, of themselves, make an employment exempt.

The Auto-Enrolment Act does not remove existing obligations to provide access to a PRSA where required under pensions legislation; employers should continue to comply with those obligations alongside MyFutureFund.

Opt-out, suspension and re-enrolment (employee choices)

MyFutureFund is not fully mandatory. Employees must stay enrolled for a minimum of six months, after which they may opt out or suspend contributions in defined windows.

Opt-out

• Employees can opt out six months after enrolment, during months seven and eight.
• Employees can also opt out six months after each contribution rate change (during months seven and eight after the change).
• If an employee opts out, their contributions are refunded; employer and State contributions remain invested for their benefit.
• Employees who opt out and remain eligible will be automatically re-enrolled after two years.

Suspension

• Employees can suspend contributions at any time outside the initial six-month mandatory participation period.
• Suspension is for a period of 1–2 years; employees cannot resume contributions before at least one year has elapsed.

Re-Enrolled

After a maximum of two years, eligible employees are automatically re-enrolled.

Operationally, opt-outs and suspensions are actioned through NAERSA and are reflected back to employers via AEPN updates.

Penalties, Enforcement and HR risk points

Employers should treat MyFutureFund as a statutory payroll obligation. Failure to apply AEPN instructions, deduct and remit contributions, or withholding contributions can trigger enforcement action. Government guidance also highlights that it is an offence to hinder or attempt to hinder employee participation (including pressuring staff to opt out or suspend).

Common HR pitfalls to avoid:

• Offering “cash in lieu of pension” arrangements without ensuring the employee is in exempt employment (these employees may still be auto-enrolled).
• Assuming a non-payroll PRSA (paid directly by the employee) will prevent auto-enrolment.
• Relying on a token PRSA contribution that does not meet the new exemption standards (3.5% total / 1.5% employer).
• Failing to issue enrolment notifications to employees or to keep evidence of communications.

Practical implementation checklist (first 30 days)

• Confirm employer portal registration and payment method (ideally variable direct debit).
• Confirm payroll software is updated to retrieve and apply AEPNs and to submit contribution information to NAERSA.
• Map pay elements that fall into ‘gross pay’ (overtime, commission, allowances) so the contribution base is accurate.
• Audit existing occupational scheme/PRSA contribution levels for roles you wish to keep exempt; adjust contribution structures to meet the December 2025 standards where needed.
• Prepare a short employee communication explaining (i) the scheme, (ii) contribution rates and pay cap, (iii) opt-out/suspension options, and (iv) where to find NAERSA portal support.
• Train HR and line managers: no pressure on employees to opt out; refer queries to HR/payroll/NAERSA as appropriate.
• Keep records of AEPNs applied, payments made, and enrolment notifications issued.

FAQs

Q: Do we need to amend employment contracts to implement MyFutureFund?

A: Generally, no. MyFutureFund operates by law. Employers should, however, ensure policies/communications are updated and that payroll processes are compliant.

Q: If we already offer a PRSA, are we automatically exempt?

A: Not necessarily. Exemption is per employment and depends on actual contributions through payroll to a qualifying arrangement meeting the exemption standards.

Q: Does an employee’s personal PRSA paid by direct debit make the employment exempt?

A: No. NAERSA relies on Revenue payroll data. Contributions outside payroll are not visible for exemption purposes.

Q: What are the new exemption standards for defined contribution schemes/PRSAs?

A: Total contributions must average at least 3.5% of gross pay, including at least 1.5% employer contribution, subject to the €80,000-related caps.

Q: If an employee contributes 3.5% to a payroll PRSA but the employer contributes 0%, is the employment exempt?

A: No, on the current standards (employer minimum of 1.5% is required for defined contribution/PRSA exemption).

Q: If an employer contributes 3.5% to a payroll PRSA and the employee contributes 0%, is the employment exempt?

A: Yes, provided it is a qualifying PRSA and the contributions are properly reported through payroll.

Q: When do we pay contributions if payroll is monthly?

A: Contributions are due at the same time as the employee is paid. For monthly pay, that means each monthly pay date.

Q: Does the €20,000 eligibility threshold look at each job separately?

A: No. Eligibility for the €20,000 threshold is assessed across all employments, but enrolment occurs only for employments without exempt pension coverage.

Q: Do we still have to provide access to a PRSA under existing pensions rules?

A: Yes. The Auto-Enrolment Act does not remove existing PRSA access obligations.

Q: Can employees opt out or suspend?

A: Yes. They must stay in the scheme for 6 months, then can opt out in months 7 and 8 (refund of employee contributions). Alternatively, they can suspend for 1–2 years (no refunds).

Q: Are the employee contributions taken from net or gross salary?

A: The contribution are taken from the net income, after deductions.

Q: How do employees access their MyFutureFund accounts?

A: To access the account, employee will need to visit MyFutureFunds portal and log in using their verified myGovID credentials to log in.

The post MyFutureFund Auto-Enrolment – Updated Regulations, Employer Guidance Note and FAQs appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

Definition of Compensation

Section 7 of the Act, states that:

(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid,

(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister,

(e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14,

(f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.

In general, compensation is the most favoured remedy^[3] and this is likely to increase given the Supreme Court decision in An Bord Banistiochta, Gaelscoil Moshiolog v The Department of Education & ors[4] (the “O’Suird Decision”) where the Supreme Court reasserted the exceptionality of both the reinstatement and re-engagement remedy.

Whilst the above statutory provision is comprehensive, one cannot say that it is entirely comprehensible and the WRC often faces a difficulty in assessing the amount of compensation due under Sec. 7(1)(c) of the Act. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the Regulations passed under Sec. 17 of the Act[5] only deal with the calculation of weekly remuneration. Whilst this is relatively straightforward for weekly paid employees, it is considerably more challenging when faced with a senior executive whose paid monthly with a remuneration package comprising of a yearly bonus, stock options, pension contributions, health insurance, a car allowance, not to mention trying to put a cash value on future loss of earnings and the likelihood of re-employment. Whilst it is a tempting argument to assert that SI 287/1977 should be confined to those paid weekly, regrettably Sec. 7 of the Act makes no such distinction.

As if the above is not convoluted enough, an added complication is that the High Court has said that Sec. 7(1)(c) ‘…does not envisage the deciding body being required to always or perhaps ever, engage in a calculation or mathematical formula by which it determines the extent of the financial loss exclusively by reference to the weekly remuneration of an employee’[6]. It is difficult to see how this can be reconciled with the fact that the regulations expressly set out a particular formula as to how to calculate weekly remuneration. However, it may be that the court had in mind the final words of Sec. 7(1)(c), which provide that the loss is to be assessed “as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances.” That phrase plainly invites adjudicators to take a broad and balanced view of the case as a whole.

Financial Loss

Financial loss is defined in Sec. 7(3) of the Act:

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation;

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.

Financial loss is therefore limited to actual loss.

Actual Loss

In common law, one of the fundamental rules of damages for breach of contract is that compensation is awarded only for the loss suffered. The purpose is not to punish the party in breach, but to compensate the innocent party and to place them in, in so far as money can, the same position as if the contract had been properly performed. This is undoubtedly what the legislature had in mind when they specifically added the word ‘actual’ to the definition of financial loss in Sec. 7, i.e. the person should be no better off. The EAT, having had to assess what constitutes actual loss, determined that they should work from the net weekly pay figures. Thus, in the case of Employee v Employer[7] the EAT determined that the claimant’s compensation should be calculated on the basis of net weekly pay. The claimant had argued for a gross weekly figure of €950, but the Tribunal held that both the Rights Commissioner’s and Tribunal’s determinations were correctly based on a net figure of €730. It expressly noted that the award was “based on payments which were already net of tax,” confirming that the EAT viewed loss under the Act in terms of net pay.

This calculation of loss based on net weekly pay figures seems to have been lost on the WRC. In contrast, the WRC’s approach, as seen in Ray Walsh v Econocom Digital Finance[8] and Maria Inmaculada De La Torre Ruiz v Hamilton UK Services Ltd[9], is to assess compensation based on gross pay. It seems there has been a distinct shift from the EAT’s net-based loss calculations to a gross pay standard now used in WRC determinations. This approach has been followed by the Labour Court. Thus, in assessing the loss due to the Complainant in Hyph Ireland Ltd v Michael Kiely[10] where the Labour Court awarded €445,440, the Court worked off the Gross Pay. This does not appear to be consistent with the Act.

Estimated Prospective of Future Loss

The WRC is also required to assess “any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal.” This exercise is, by its nature, speculative, and the task of the WRC is to determine what is just and equitable in the circumstances. The calculation must be based on net pay figures. This is self-evident, as Adjudicators are charged with assessing the ‘actual loss’ that the complainant has sustained[11]. If gross pay were used, the complainant would effectively be compensated for income they could never have received, which would have been paid in income tax, leaving them in a better position than before the dismissal. Unfortunately, there appears to have been some slippage in the consistent application of this principle[12].

Deductions

1. Social Welfare:

Social Welfare payments used to be deducted from any award of compensation. This changed with the 1993 Amendment which inserted a new Sec. 7(2A) into the Act. This provides that, in calculating financial loss, payments to the employee under the Social Welfare Acts in respect of any period post the dismissal and any payment under the Income Tax Acts arising by reason of the dismissal, shall be disregarded.

      2. Redundancy Payments:

As noted above, Sec. 7(3) also includes any loss “…. of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation”. This definition thus allows adjudicators to compensate complainants for the loss of their rights under the Redundancy Payments Acts. What this means precisely is not that clear. Obviously, every employee who has 104 weeks continuous employment qualifies for statutory redundancy in the event that their role becomes redundant. This section specifically refers to ‘their rights’. However, it is likely that the right to a statutory redundancy payment never arises for the majority of employees. Therefore, it might well be argued that this section envisages a right that has actually vested, i.e. that the persons role was redundant, but they were denied their statutory payment, akin to the notion of a vested stock option (discussed below). In other words, it is a right that, but for the employee’s dismissal, they would have received it and they cannot lose a right that they would never have received. Thus, the section envisages an adjudicator assessing whether the person was denied a redundancy payment as a result of their dismissal. Howe if no such redundancy would have occurred then the person could not have been denied a right. Notably, the section makes no reference to ex-gratia payments in excess of statutory redundancy.

The treatment of redundancy payments in unfair-dismissal awards has been inconsistent. Earlier EAT decisions took conflicting approaches. In Employee v Employer^[13] and in Employee v An Employer^[14], redundancy payments were either included within or deducted from the unfair-dismissal award. In contrast, Employee v Employer^[15] and Employee v Employer^[16] held that redundancy and unfair-dismissal payments were separate entitlements, awarding compensation in addition to statutory redundancy lump sums.

The turning point seems to have arrived with Michael O’Brien v Furlong Flooring Ltd[17], where the EAT confirmed it had no jurisdiction to offset redundancy payments as they arise under different legislation and may include State-funded elements. This decision specifically referred to the, then in place, redundancy rebate, which has since been abolished. Notably, the employer member of the Tribunal dissented.

This reasoning appears to have shaped a small number of Adjudicators approach. In Kieran Murray v Sherry Garden Rooms Ltd^[18] , Adjudication Officer (“AO”) Kevin Baneham ruled that there is no statutory or equitable basis to deduct redundancy payments, a view later followed in Mary McInerney v Isobel O’Dea^[19] and Lindsay Dicken v Velocity EHS Ireland^[20]. In both McInerney and Dicken, the WRC held that redundancy is based on service, whereas unfair dismissal compensation reflects loss, and therefore one cannot reduce the other.

In Anne Morris v Limerick Chambers of Commerce^[21], AO Ewa Sobanska noted that statutory notice pay of eight weeks was factored into the loss calculation, but doesn’t seem to have made any deduction for the redundancy payment of €19,915 when awarding six months’ salary worth €17,420, aligning broadly with the Murray approach.

In James Watt v Ryan Investments Ltd^[22], Sarah Daly BL argued that Murray was incorrectly decided and that the Act refer to any financial loss attributable to the dismissal — contending that because the complainant received €21,621 in redundancy, that payment was inherently connected to the dismissal, and that there was therefore no loss. The AO rejected this argument, finding that income and accrued statutory redundancy rights are distinct elements and should not be conflated.

Outliers to this approach within the WRC are Orla Sheehy v Megagen Implants UK LTD^[23] and Donal Finnegan v Liffeyfield Limited t/a Bonnington Hotel^[24]. In Sheehy, AO Michael McEntee made an award “Allowing for a deduction to reflect the Statutory redundancy already paid”, and in Finnegan AO John Harraghy gave an award that took “into account the payment of €8,002 already made” which was a redundancy payment. No reason is provided by the AOs in either decision as to why they don’t follow the logic in Murray.

Overall, both the EAT and the WRC have displayed inconsistency in their treatment of redundancy payments when assessing compensation for unfair dismissal. While decisions such as Murray, McInerney, Dicken and Morris treat redundancy and unfair-dismissal payments as distinct and non-offsettable, Sheehy and Finnegan have taken the opposite approach by deducting redundancy sums or factoring them into the award. This demonstrates an ongoing divergence in how adjudicators interpret Sec. 7 of the Act. If the starting point in assessing compensation is to establish the complainant’s actual financial loss, statutory redundancy payments cannot logically be treated as a completely separate entitlement. Sec. 7(3) refers to the loss of the right to a redundancy payment, not to the payment itself, and allowing a complainant to retain a redundancy lump sum while also receiving a full 104 weeks award of compensation would them in a better financial position than if no dismissal had occurred. Such an outcome would conflict with the principle of “actual loss.”

Equally, allowing statutory redundancy to be treated as non-offsettable while ex-gratia payments can be deducted does not appear to represent a coherent or defensible legal distinction. In Kaye McDonnell v Sodexo^[25], the Complainant received an ex-gratia lump sum equivalent to one year’s pay, which included her statutory entitlement. AO Breffni O’Neill found that the dismissal was unfair but accepted that the lump sum covered the loss. As both an ex-gratia payment and statutory redundancy are monetary sums arising from the same termination, it is difficult to see how one can properly be deducted while the other cannot.

      3. Stock Options

As part of considering future loss, the WRC will have to consider, bonuses, average overtime pay, any fringe benefits, such as VHI, death in service benefit, car allowances and stock options.

In the case of Florish v Alienvault Inc^[26], the EAT distinguished between vested and unvested stock options and determined that the “the unvested stock options at the time of the dismissal should not and do not form part of the assessment of loss in this case”’^[27]. There are few cases on the matter of stock options, but they clearly meet the definition of remuneration under the Act and therefore have to be considered. Simply put, unvested stock options are options that have been granted but not yet earned – they will become earned in time, depending on the employee being employed at the time they vest. To this extent, they can be said to be no different to other forms of remuneration such as pension or death in service benefit. On the other hand, vested options are options that the employee has actually earned. Once vested, they have exercise them, i.e. buy them at the pre-determined ‘strike’ price any time before they expire and to that extent they own them. The WRC’s approach to equity-based remuneration has turned on whether the benefit in question is realised and quantifiable or speculative and contingent. In Vice President v Professional, Scientific & Technical[28] and in Gráinne Sherlock v Pluralsight Ireland Ltd[29], the WRC excluded unvested stock options on the grounds that their value was uncertain, dependent on future vesting, and not proven as financial loss. Maria Inmaculada De La Torre Ruiz reaffirmed this approach in 2025, confirming that unvested stock options or share awards cannot be included as remuneration under the Act.

Gary Rooney v Twitter International Unlimited Company^[30], while superficially appearing to depart from this pattern, does so on factual rather than legal grounds. The payments in Rooney – the “Equity Grants/Deferred Cash Consideration”—were not unvested or contingent stock options, but cash payments made via payroll representing a vested entitlement linked directly to employment. Therefore, they were treated as part of the complainant’s ordinary remuneration.

The WRC continues to exclude unvested or speculative stock options from compensation calculations, but where an equity-related benefit is realised, vested, or paid as cash, as in Rooney, it may properly be included as part of an employee’s financial loss. Whilst this approach is consistent with that of the EAT, the difficulty lies with the definition of ‘actual loss’. It is easy to conclude that something that is not earned cannot represent a loss. However, options both vested and unvested are given by way of an initial grant to employees. As such, they represent some form of benefit to be earned in future and are ‘granted’ as both a reward and retention tool. Vesting occurs over a certain period, normally 4 to 5 years but it can be longer. Arguably, they will not be granted if the company does not want to retain the person for that period. Thus, if they are dismissed within that vesting period, they lose the value of those unvested options and they do so as a result of their dismissal. The loss therefore derives from and is attributable (per Sec. 7 of the Act) to the dismissal^[31].

Conclusion

Recent WRC and Labour Court decisions reveal a marked drift from the statutory principle that compensation under the Act must reflect actual loss. The relatively new but growing practice of basing awards on gross rather than net pay and of declining to offset redundancy payment, represents a legally unsound interpretation of Sec. 7 of the Act. These decisions risk transforming compensation into an exercise in enrichment.

While adjudicators may well be motivated by equitable considerations, such as the taxation of awards and the complainant’s ability to mitigate their loss in an economy of full employment, such reasoning cannot override the clear wording and purpose of the Act. In order to advise clients properly, practitioners in this field are entitled to a coherent and consistent approach from the WRC and Labour Court based on the Act and previous jurisprudence. As it stands, they are left wondering who will be the adjudicator and advising on the basis of what they have held in the past. The issue of the non-deduction of statutory redundancy payments from awards and the non-inclusion of unvested stock options requires some intervention by the Superior Courts.

Comment – Alastair Purdy SC

Aside from the above, I read with interest the views of Mr. Ger Deering and Mr. Kieran Mulvey as reported in IRN^[32] both of whom were speaking at a special conference to mark the 10 – year anniversary of the WRC. Mr. Deering questioned the need to name people involved in WRC cases. This is a welcome comment as there is no doubt that many complainants are reluctant to take cases for fear of being named, thus affecting their future employability. Whilst justice must be seen to be administered in public, there appears something very wrong in indirectly penalising someone for exercising their statutory rights.

IRN noted that lawyers were the most prominent critics of the workplace reform project and that the EAT was ‘favoured more by the legal profession than the social partners. I am not sure I can agree with this opinion. It cannot be said that the EAT was more intimidating than the present fora.  Further all practitioners (in the field of employment law) recognised that having five separate bodies, (the Equality Tribunal, Rights Commissioner, Labour Court, Labour Relations Commission and the Employment Appeals Tribunal) adjudicating on various employment disputes was untenable. Lawyers were concerned, rightly, that the removal of a large body of legal knowledge, present in the EAT and replacing it with primarily non-legal practitioners could lead to issues. Equally a concern was conflating the excellent Industrial Relations work of the Labour Court with what is essentially the determination of cases based on statute.

As is evident from this article, some of those concerns, regrettably, have been realised. All practitioners, be they lawyers or otherwise, are entitled to have some consistency of determination and a proper application of the law.

There are simple fixes though. A first step would be to allow practitioners to by-pass the first instance necessity of going to the WRC on Unfair Dismissal and Discriminatory Dismissal disputes, as was the case with the Rights Commissioner. These are generally the more complicated cases and by their very nature take longer to hear. They are taking a long time to deal with and are proving very costly for complainants in both time and money – a one stop venue in the Labour Court would solve this by speeding these cases up, something that the Workplace Relations Act 2015 promised to do but which has failed to have been delivered upon. This would also make it easier for Complainants to access representation, as the current system militates against complainants getting proper access to justice due to its expense, again, something that the 2015 Act, sought to remedy. Lastly, having a dedicated division(s) of the Labour Court to deal with Unfair and Discriminatory Dismissal Claims and having a specialist separate division to deal with Industrial Relations disputes would allow for greater consistency in decisions.

The views expressed here are solely those of the author and not representative of Alastair Purdy LLP solicitors.

Alastair Purdy SC.

[1] Philip Smyth v RSA Insurance Ltd UD1673/2013

[2] See Gary Rooney v Twitter International Unlimited Company ADJ-00044246 [2024] where the adjudicator awarded €550,131; Hyph Ireland Ltd v Michael Kiely UDD2533 where the Labour Court awarded €445,440 and A Sales Executive v A Software Company ADJ-00027573 [2022] where the Adjudicator awarded the Complainant €329,1999 representing 75% of his financial loss.

[3] Note that there is no breakdown in the WRC annual reports as to the remedy and this is merely by way of experience.

[4] An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Department of Education & ors [2024] IESC 38

[5] Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations, 1977 S.I No. 287/1977

[6] Brady & anor v Minister for Social Protection & anor [2016] IEHC 553 per Baker J at [23]

[7] Employee v An Employer I1/2012

[8] Ray Walsh v Econocom Digital Finance Ltd ADJ-00029093 [2022]

[9] Maria Inmaculada De La Torre Ruiz v Hamilton UK Services Ltd ADJ-00049851 [2025]

[10] Hyph Ireland Ltd v Michael Kiely UDD2533 [2025]

[11] The Workplace Relations Act 2015, refers to Complainants, prior to this it was Claimant.

[12] Op.Cit. at 2

[13] Employee v Employer (UD787/2007)

[14] Employee v Employer (UD1880/09)

[15] Employee v Employer (UD1848/2010)

[16] Employee v Employer (UD1321/2012)

[17] Michael O’Brien v Furlong Flooring Ltd (UD768/2013)

[18] Kieran Murray v Sherry Garden Rooms Ltd ADJ-00028766 [2022]

[19] Mary McInerney v Isobel O’Dea ADJ-00038044 [2023]

[20] Lindsay Dicken v Velocity EHS Ireland ADJ-00058415 [2025]

[21] Anne Morris v Limerick Chambers of Commerce ADJ-00036284 [2023]

[22] James Watt v Ryan Investments Ltd ADJ-00039164 [2023]

[23] Orla Sheehy v Megagen Implants UK LTD ADJ-00032606 [2022]

[24] Donal Finnegan v Liffeyfield Limited t/a Bonnington Hotel ADJ-00055992 [2025]

[25] Kaye McDonnell v Sodexo ADJ-00032098 [2022]

[26] Florish v Alienvault Inc. (UD800/2015)

[27] For a discussion of this topic see Alastair Purdy – ‘Employers Beware! Stock Options could be considered remuneration when defining compensation in an Unfair Dismissal Case. Irish Employment Law Journal, 2005, 2(1),17-23-2005.

[28] Vice President v Professional, Scientific & Technical ADJ-00020363 [2019]

[29] Gráinne Sherlock v Pluralsight Ireland Ltd ADJ-00044941 [2024]

[30] Gary Rooney v Twitter International Unlimited Company ADJ-00044246 [2024]

[31] There is also an argument that the vesting period, represents an extended notice period but this is solely the view of the author and has not been tested. This is so because of the fact that they are given as a retention tool. A further examination of this point is beyond the scope of this article.

[32] See IRN 36 9^th October 2025

The post Calculation of Compensation Under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977: Consistency Now Required appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

Among the key changes was the reframing of the long-standing 50:50 Rule, a central feature of Ireland’s employment permit regime that continues to influence how businesses recruit non-EEA nationals.

This article explains the 50:50 Rule, outlines the changes introduced under the 2024 Act, and considers what they mean in practice for employers.

The 50:50 Rule – Balancing the Workforce

The 50:50 Rule requires that at least half of an employer’s workforce in Ireland must be EEA, UK or Swiss nationals before an employment permit can be granted. The purpose of the Rule is to maintain a balance between local and non-EEA recruitment and to uphold Ireland’s EU-level obligations regarding labour market access.

The 50:50 Rule applies to:

• employers established in Ireland;
• Irish branches of foreign companies; and
• contractors or client companies in contract-for-services arrangements.

Importantly, the calculation includes all employees physically based in Ireland, regardless of:

• whether they work full-time or part-time;
• their immigration status; or
• their nationality.

This makes it essential for HR and management teams to maintain accurate and up-to-date workforce data when preparing permit applications.

Targeted Exceptions Introduced by the 2024 Act

While the 50:50 Rule remains a cornerstone of the system, the 2024 Act introduced limited exceptions allowing the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (the DETE) to issue employment permits where the 50:50 Rule is not fully met. These exceptions are designed to support early-stage and single-employee operations without undermining the principle of workforce balance.

Start-Up Companies: A start-up company registered with Revenue as an employer for less than two years may qualify for an exception, provided it holds a letter of support from Enterprise Ireland or IDA Ireland confirming client status. Where the start-up has not yet achieved the 50% threshold, DETE may grant a one-year employment permit, subject to evidence of progress towards compliance. Renewals will normally require full adherence to the 50:50 Rule.

Companies with No Employees: An employer with no existing employees may also qualify where the permit holder will be the sole employee. This exception may continue at renewal, provided the individual remains the only employee. Once the company seeks to hire additional staff, however, the 50:50 Rule will apply.

Historical Permits (Pre-October 2014): Permits originally issued before 1 October 2014 remain outside the scope of the 50:50 Rule. Any subsequent renewals or variations of those permits continue to benefit from this exemption.

Compliance and Risk Management

Although the 2014 Act does not impose direct penalties for breaching the 50:50 threshold, employers must exercise care and accuracy when reporting workforce percentages in permit applications. Under Section 56 of the 2024 Act, it is an offence to knowingly or recklessly provide false, misleading, or materially inaccurate information in an employment permit application. Inaccurate reporting of workforce ratios – whether intentional or careless – can therefore expose employers to:

• Regulatory investigation, including potential scrutiny by the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC);
• Criminal prosecution, with penalties of up to €50,000 in fines and/or five years’ imprisonment; and
• Revocation of permits, where the Minister determines that the information supplied was false or misleading.

In practice, this means HR and compliance teams must ensure that:

• workforce data is verified at the time of each application;
• group structures and branches are properly identified; and
• any changes in headcount or employee status are promptly updated.

Robust internal tracking of employee nationality and location will help mitigate risk and demonstrate due diligence in the event of audit or investigation.

Employer Spotlight

• The 50:50 Rule remains in full force for most employers, despite the 2024 Act’s limited exemptions.
• Exceptions are narrowly drawn and mainly benefit early-stage or single-employee entities.
• All employees physically working in Ireland are counted in the calculation, regardless of nationality or hours.
• Employers must maintain accurate workforce data and be cautious when reporting ratios to DETE.
• False or misleading applications may result in criminal and regulatory sanctions.

As Ireland’s employment landscape continues to evolve, the 50:50 Rule remains a clear benchmark for lawful recruitment of overseas workers. Employers who understand and proactively manage compliance under the 2024 Act will be best placed to secure permits efficiently, minimise risk, and maintain a trusted standing with the DETE for any future applications or renewals. The message is clear: monitor, document, and stay compliant.

This article drafted by Gloria Malandra (Trainee Solicitor).

The post Ireland’s 50:50 Rule: What Employers Need to Know Under the Employment Permits Act appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

While Irish law already imposes an implied duty of confidentiality during employment, an explicit, well-drafted clause  strengthens that obligation and extends it beyond the end of employment. Crucially, it removes doubt about what is considered confidential, how it must be handled, and the consequences of a breach.

When it comes to handling personal data, GDPR makes the case crystal clear: confidentiality isn’t optional, it’s a legal duty. Employees need to know exactly what that means in practice — especially when dealing with sensitive information like client records or medical files..  As one data security maxim reminds us, “confidentiality does not start with the firewall, but with the employees.”

But not every confidentiality clause will stand up to scrutiny in court.  To be enforceable, confidentiality provisions must serve legitimate business purposes and protect genuine confidential information. They should not be so sweeping that they infringe employee rights or public interest. This is why careful, industry-specific drafting is essential.  Tailored clauses set out clearly what is considered confidential, how it must be safeguarded, and the limits of the obligation. In the following sections, we examine how to achieve that balance and make confidentiality clauses effective in practice.

Overbroad Clauses and the Need for Tailoring

When it comes to confidentiality clauses, one size does not fit all. Drafting too broadly can render a clause unenforceable. Irish courts (and, by extension, the EU) – in line with other common law jurisdictions – will not uphold provisions that go beyond what is reasonably necessary to protect legitimate business interests. This principle is well illustrated by case law, which shows that the courts will carefully distinguish between different types of contractual restriction and scrutinise how they are drafted. In P14 Medical Ltd v Mahon [2020], for example, the UK High Court granted interim relief to enforce post-termination restrictions, including restrictive covenants, but nonetheless examined the scope of the confidentiality clause in detail.

The clause defined “Confidential Information” as covering not only trade secrets, but also “information relating to the business, products, affairs and finances” of the company, with no time limit. The court noted (para 119) that while the employee clearly had access to trade secrets, the clause sought to restrain the use of much broader categories of merely confidential information indefinitely. This was considered impermissibly wide, as it attempted to extend protection beyond genuine trade secrets after employment had ended.

The judgment is a reminder that courts will differentiate between types of restriction (e.g. non-compete, non-solicitation, confidentiality) and apply the proportionality test to each. Confidentiality clauses must be carefully drawn: trade secrets can attract indefinite protection, but lesser categories of confidential information must usually be limited in duration and scope.

Irish courts take a similar approach. In Net Affinity Ltd v Conaghan [2011] IEHC 160, the High Court held that a 12-month non-compete clause was void because it was too wide and not limited geographically. However, the Court recognised that the employee’s access to confidential information and customer connections created a legitimate risk, and granted more targeted injunctive relief — including a 12-month restriction on soliciting existing customers and an injunction restraining breaches of confidentiality.

This case highlights why narrower, well-defined confidentiality clauses are more likely to withstand scrutiny. The Court rejected a blanket restraint on competition but was willing to uphold and enforce proportionate protections tied to genuine confidential information and specific client relationships.

A tailored clause should clearly identify the categories of information being protected – for example, technical designs, client databases, pricing strategies – and limit restrictions to what is necessary in scope, geography (if applicable) and duration. For ordinary confidential information, 2–5 years post-employment is common; trade secrets can justifiably be protected indefinitely.

The takeaway is simple: narrower is safer. A focused clause is more credible, more enforceable, and more likely to achieve its purpose. A generic, copy-and-paste provision risks leaving your business with no contractual protection at all.

Industry-Specific Considerations

Before drafting a confidentiality clause, regard should always be had to the industry in which the business operates and the specific information it needs to protect. A clause that is appropriate for a technology start-up may be wholly inadequate – or unnecessarily wide – for a law firm or medical practice. Tailoring the provision to the realities of the business ensures it protects what matters most while remaining enforceable. For example:

• Healthcare and Medical: Protect patient-identifiable information, clinical trial data, and medical research (all of which is deemed special category data under GDPR). The clause should reflect legal and ethical duties in the sector, ensuring staff understand their obligation to safeguard this highly sensitive information.
• Technology and R&D: Focus on proprietary algorithms, source code, product roadmaps, prototypes, and unpublished patents. If client or user data is central to the business, include clear protection for security protocols and data integrity.
• Financial Services: Address client lists, transaction data, investment strategies, and other non-public financial information. Ensure the clause aligns with regulatory obligations, such as restrictions on market disclosure or anti-money laundering rules.

By defining the precise categories of information that need protection in each industry, the clause becomes both stronger and more defensible if challenged.

Best Practices for Drafting Enforceable Confidentiality Clauses

A strong confidentiality clause should be precise, proportionate, and clear. The aim is to protect genuine confidential information in a way the courts will uphold. Key drafting steps include:

Define “Confidential Information” Precisely: Avoid blanket definitions. List specific categories relevant to the business, such as customer lists, financial records, technical designs, trade secrets, and sensitive client data. Exclude trivial or public information to show the clause is targeted.

• Set Purpose and Scope: Make clear that confidential information is provided solely for the employee’s role and must not be used or disclosed outside that context, both during and after employment.
• Apply Sensible Time Limits: Use finite periods (typically 2–5 years) for ordinary confidential information, with indefinite protection reserved for genuine trade secrets. Be prepared to justify any indefinite period.
• Allow for Legal and Ethical Disclosures: Include carve-outs for whistleblowing, disclosures required by law, or regulatory reporting. This demonstrates the clause is balanced and lawful.
• Scale Clauses by Seniority: Match confidentiality scope to the employee’s role and access. Senior staff may require broader definitions, longer restrictions, and stricter return/deletion obligations, while junior staff may only need narrower, role-specific protections. This proportional approach improves enforceability and avoids overreach.
• Require Return or Deletion of Material: On termination (or on request), employees should return all company materials and delete any confidential information from personal devices or accounts.
• State Remedies for Breach: Specify that breaches may cause irreparable harm and that the employer can seek injunctions and damages. Clear consequences strengthen deterrence.
• Include Severability: Include a “blue-pencil” clause that allows unenforceable parts to be removed without invalidating the rest, while remembering that courts will not rewrite an overbroad clause.
• Review and Tailor Regularly: Update clauses to reflect changes in roles, business operations, and law. Avoid using the same clause for all positions without adjustment.
• Reinforce with Policies and Training: Support contractual duties with internal policies, training, and a workplace culture that treats confidentiality seriously.

Key Point: Draft with a scalpel, not a sledgehammer. Precision increases enforceability, reduces disputes, and ensures the clause protects what truly matters.

The post Beyond the Firewall: Why Confidentiality Clauses Matter appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

From 2025, gender pay gap (GPG) reporting in Ireland enters a new phase with enhanced regulatory requirements, broader employer coverage, and a centralised reporting system set to reshape how pay transparency is managed. For many employers – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) coming into scope for the first time – understanding these changes is critical for legal compliance and effective preparation. This article outlines the key developments for 2025, their implications for employers, and the practical steps necessary to ensure compliance.

The Gender Pay Gap vs Equal Pay

Before examining the 2025 updates, it’s important to clarify the distinction between the GPG and equal pay. The GPG measures the disparity in average hourly earnings between men and women across an entire organisation; it does not mean that men and women are being paid unequally for the same job.

In contrast, Ireland’s equal pay laws – notably the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015 – specifically prohibit paying employees differently for like work (work that is the same or of equal value). In short, a company can have a GPG without violating equal pay laws, if for example more men occupy higher-paid roles. GPG reporting is about transparency in aggregate pay differences, whereas equal pay legislation deals with unlawful pay discrimination for the same work.

Expanded Employer Coverage in 2025

One of the most significant changes in 2025 is the expansion of which employers must report their GPG. Since June 2025, the employee threshold for mandatory GPG reporting dropped to 50 employees, down from previous thresholds of 250 employees (when reporting was first introduced in 2022) and 150 employees (in 2024). This means that many mid-sized companies and larger SMEs in Ireland will be subject to GPG reporting for the first time. The Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth estimates that lowering the threshold to 50 employees will bring roughly 6,000 organisations into scope, covering a majority of the Irish workforce. Employers with fewer than 50 employees remain exempt, but those at or above the 50 mark must now prepare to comply.

For newly in-scope employers, this expansion underscores the need to put robust payroll analytics and reporting processes in place. Smaller organisations often have limited HR infrastructure, so early planning is essential to meet the requirements and timelines discussed below.

Revised Reporting Timeline

Along with broader coverage, the reporting timeline has been tightened for 2025. Employers are required to choose a “snapshot date” in June 2025 to capture pay data for their workforce. The GPG calculations will be based on the 12-month period leading up to that snapshot date. Notably, the deadline to publish the GPG report has been moved up – reports must be published within five months of the snapshot date, by the end of November 2025, which is one month earlier than the previous December deadline.

This shorter timeframe means organisations will need to work quickly after the June snapshot to calculate their pay gap metrics, draft the required report (including narratives, as discussed below), and complete internal reviews. The change to a November deadline emphasizes the importance of earlier preparation. Employers should aim to have their data collection and analysis substantially completed over the summer so that any issues can be addressed well before the November cutoff. For companies unfamiliar with the process, starting early in 2025 is crucial to avoid last-minute compliance risks.

New Centralised Reporting Portal

A major development for 2025 is the introduction of a centralised online reporting portal for GPG data. On 8 March 2025, the government (Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, and Integration) announced that an official GPG reporting portal will launch in Autumn 2025. All employers in scope will be required to upload their GPG reports to this portal, which will serve as a public, searchable database of GPG information across all reporting organisations.

Previously, Irish employers satisfied the law by publishing their GPG report on their own website (or making it available at their premises). While companies may still choose to publish the report on their site, the government portal submission will be mandatory once it goes live. This central repository is designed to enhance transparency and comparability: anyone (employees, job seekers, the media, researchers, etc.) will be able to search the portal and compare pay gap data across companies and sectors. It also streamlines administration by consolidating reporting in one place.

For employers, the new portal means an additional step – registering and uploading the report – but also potentially less ambiguity about where and how to publish the data. It will be important for companies to follow any guidance on the portal’s format requirements. The increased visibility also raises the stakes on accuracy and narrative clarity, as reports will be more readily scrutinized side by side.

Summary of Reporting Obligations

Under the Irish regulations, each in-scope employer must calculate and report a set of key metrics on gender-based pay differences within their organisation. The required GPG metrics include:

• Mean and median hourly pay gap between male and female employees (the percentage difference in average pay for all men versus all women).
• Mean and median bonus pay gap between male and female employees.
• The proportion of male and female employees receiving bonus pay.
• The proportion of male and female employees receiving benefits in kind (non-cash benefits, e.g. company cars, health insurance).
• The percentage of male and female employees in each pay quartile of the organisation’s pay distribution (i.e. dividing the workforce into four equal parts from lowest paid to highest paid and reporting the gender split in each quartile).

These figures provide a multi-faceted view of where pay disparities exist – for example, differences in bonuses or the concentration of genders in lower vs. upper pay bands.

In addition to the numeric disclosures, a narrative statement must accompany the data. Employers are expected to provide an explanation for the causes of any GPGs that exist, and (importantly) to outline the measures being taken or planned to address those gaps. This narrative gives vital context to the raw numbers. For instance, an employer might explain that a gap is due to more men in senior roles, and then describe a mentorship or recruitment program to support women’s advancement. The narrative is an opportunity for employers to demonstrate awareness and proactive effort, which can influence how their report is perceived by both the public and their own employees.

Next Steps for Employers

For employers – especially those reporting for the first time in 2025 – there are several practical steps that should be taken now to ensure smooth compliance:

• Audit your data: Begin by auditing payroll and HR records to ensure all relevant pay data (including base pay, bonuses, benefits, overtime, etc.) is accurate and complete ahead of the snapshot dates. Identifying any data quality issues or anomalies early will save time later. Make sure you have a clear headcount of all employees (full-time, part-time, temporary) as of the snapshot date, since the threshold and calculations include various types of workers.
• Perform a trial GPG calculation: It’s advisable to run internal GPG calculations before the official snapshot, using recent data. This practice run can highlight any significant gaps or technical questions about the calculations. If large gaps appear, management should be made aware and discussions can start on explanations and action plans.
• Prepare the narrative and action plan: Start drafting the narrative report that will accompany your numbers. This should explain any identified pay gaps and, crucially, describe measures to address them. Consider involving your HR, legal, and diversity & inclusion teams in crafting this statement – it should be truthful but also demonstrate commitment to improvement. If needed, seek legal input to ensure the narrative is appropriately worded (especially if it touches on sensitive matters).
• Get acquainted with the reporting portal: Keep an eye out for the launch of the government’s reporting portal in Autumn 2025. There may be user guides or training provided. It would be wise to register an account early and familiarise yourself with how to upload information.
• Meet the deadline and publish: Plan backwards from the November 2025 deadline to leave time for internal review and sign-off. By late October, you should aim to have the final metrics and narrative ready for executive approval. Remember that you will need to submit the report via the online portal (and optionally on your own website) by the end of November.
• Communicate internally: Once the report is published, be transparent with your employees about the results. Consider having an internal briefing or communication from leadership about what the numbers show and what steps the company is taking.

By tackling these steps early, employers will not only ensure compliance but also derive more value from the process – using it as a chance to diagnose and address underlying issues in pay and representation.

EU Pay Transparency Directive – Overlap and Future Impact

Looking beyond 2025, employers should be aware of incoming EU-wide rules that will significantly influence pay transparency and equal pay obligations. The European Union’s Pay Transparency Directive (Directive (EU) 2023/970) was adopted in 2023, and Ireland (like all member states) must transpose it into national law by 7 June 2026. While this directive shares the goal of promoting gender pay equity, it introduces additional requirements that go beyond the current Irish GPG reporting regime:

• Granular pay gap reporting: The directive will require employers to report on gender pay differences in much more detail – specifically, to break down pay gap data by categories of workers (such as by job level or role) and by pay type (basic vs. variable pay). This is a more complex task than Ireland’s current high-level average metrics, as it demands a finer analysis of internal pay structures.
• Action on significant gaps: Under the EU rules, reporting is not just a transparency exercise; it can trigger corrective action. If an employer finds an unexplained gender pay gap of 5% or more between male and female workers within the same category of work, and this gap persists for six months without objective justification, the employer must conduct a “joint pay assessment” with worker representatives. The purpose of this assessment is to analyse the gap in detail, identify the causes, and implement measures to close it. Moreover, the employer will be obliged to remedy the pay difference within a reasonable period. This mechanism means that large, unjustified pay gaps will no longer be a matter of simply reporting and explaining – they will demand concrete action plans and collaboration with employees to fix the issue.
• Broader transparency rights for individuals: The Pay Transparency Directive also grants new rights to employees and job applicants, which will affect employers of all sizes (not just those with 50+ employees). For example, pay transparency for job-seekers will require employers to disclose the initial pay level or salary range in job vacancy notices or before interviews. Employers will also be banned from asking candidates about their past salary history, a practice that can perpetuate pay inequality. Furthermore,  employees will have a right to request information about their own pay and the average pay levels of colleagues of the other gender doing the same work or work of equal value. Employers must provide this information within a set timeframe (e.g. within two months of request), which arms employees with data to assess whether they are being fairly paid. In addition, the directive will prohibit contractual clauses that prevent staff from discussing or disclosing their pay for the purpose of enforcing equal pay rights.
• Enforcement and compliance changes: The introduction of the directive is expected to bring more stringent enforcement of pay equality. Notably, Ireland’s adoption of these rules will likely involve introducing penalties for non-compliance – something that the current Irish GPG reporting law lacks. In fact, it is anticipated that when Ireland transposes the directive (sometimes informally referred to as the Pay Transparency Act in local discussions), it will come with financial or statutory penalties for failing to meet the new requirements.

In summary, the EU Pay Transparency Directive will complement Ireland’s GPG reporting framework but also raise the bar. It overlaps with GPG reporting in seeking to illuminate and reduce gender-based pay disparities, but diverges by mandating direct equal-pay remedies and extending transparency to all aspects of the employment cycle (hiring, promotions, etc.). From a compliance and operational standpoint, Irish employers should start preparing now. Reviewing compensation structures, updating recruitment practices (e.g. readying pay range disclosures for job ads and removing salary history questions), and setting up robust systems for handling pay data requests will put organisations in a strong position when the new rules arrive.

Conclusion

With expanded reporting thresholds, a tighter timeline, and a central reporting portal, GPG reporting in 2025 represents a significant shift in pay transparency standards for Irish employers. Those coming into scope for the first time should view this not just as a compliance exercise but as an opportunity to understand their workforce dynamics and demonstrate commitment to equality. Early and thorough preparation is vital – not only to meet the legal requirements, but also to reinforce a positive employer brand in an era of increasing transparency.

As future EU measures on pay transparency loom, staying proactive on GPG analysis will put employers ahead of the curve. By embracing these changes and actively addressing any gaps, organisations can improve trust among employees and position themselves as fair, inclusive workplaces.

This article was drafted by Stephen Barry (Trainee).

The post Gender Pay Gap Reporting in 2025 appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

This outcome contrasts sharply with the expectations set at the time of the legislation’s introduction. When first announced in November 2022, the Government stated that the 2023 Act would “offer less commuting, fewer transport emissions, better quality of life with more time with family and friends… new job opportunities for people who want to live in rural Ireland, for people with disabilities and for people with caring responsibilities.” The ambition was social and economic transformation – so why has the practical impact been so modest?

This article revisits those early expectations and evaluates whether the most recent decisions reflect a change in how the right to request remote working is being interpreted.

The 2023 Act

The 2023 Act ushered in a new statutory framework for remote working. For the first time, all employees have a legal right to request a remote working arrangement (“RWA”). This was widely welcomed as a post-pandemic step toward more flexible work practices. Importantly, however, the 2023 Act does not guarantee employees the right to work remotely – only the right to ask. In practice, this means employers are not obliged to grant every request, but they are obliged to follow a defined process when such requests are made.

Under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act, employers must adhere to specific procedural steps when an employee requests remote working:

Employee Request Requirements (Section 20):

• An employee’s request must be in writing (hard copy or electronic), signed and submitted at least 8 weeks before the proposed start of the remote work arrangement.
• The request should detail the nature of the remote working arrangement sought, the proposed start and end dates, the proposed remote location, and information on the location’s suitability.
• The employee must also state their reasons for the request. Employers are entitled to ask for further information if something is missing or unclear.

Employer’s Duty to Consider and Respond (Section 21):

• Once a valid request is received, the employer must give it consideration, weighing business needs, the employee’s needs, and the requirements set out in the WRC Code of Practice.
• This consideration should be “objective, fair, and reasonable”.
• The employer must respond within 4 weeks by either approving, refusing with reasons, or requesting an extension (up to 8 additional weeks).

Documenting Approval or Refusal:

• If approved, a written agreement must be drawn up, signed by both parties, outlining the scope of remote work, start and end dates, and any other conditions.
• If refused, the employer’s written notice must include reasons for rejecting such.

What does the case law say?

Recent WRC decisions provide a clear picture of how the statutory right to request remote working is functioning in practice and the limits of adjudicative review.

In Musaev v TikTok Technology Ltd (ADJ-00052437), the employee sought full-time remote work due to the psychological effects of commuting following a serious road traffic accident. Despite compelling personal circumstances, the WRC upheld the employer’s decision to refuse the request because it was satisfied that TikTok had followed the statutory process under Sections 20 and 21. The Adjudication Officer held that once proper consideration was given, the WRC was precluded under Section 27 from assessing the merits of the refusal. The complaint was dismissed as not properly founded.

In Varvara Gintaliene v Cognizant Technology Solutions Ireland Ltd (ADJ-00053903), the employee submitted a well-reasoned request for remote working, citing a lengthy commute, family responsibilities, and strong productivity while working from home during the pandemic. The employer issued its written response one week outside the statutory 4-week period but had verbally informed the employee in advance of the delay. The WRC deemed this a technical breach, not warranting redress, particularly as the employer’s overall process was found to be objective, fair, and reasonable. The refusal was grounded in a contractual agreement with the client to whom the employee was assigned, which required on-site performance of duties. While the employee challenged the absence of documentary evidence, the WRC accepted credible oral testimony and acknowledged the employer’s efforts to consider alternatives. Crucially, the Adjudication Officer observed: “Each case will turn on its own particular facts and once satisfied as to adherence with the requirements of Section 21(1)(a)(i), (ii) & (iii) of the Act and the Code of Practice, it is not for the Adjudication Officer to look behind the decision or reason/s given.” In this instance, the refusal was substantiated by the factual matrix and upheld.

In contrast to the above, and for the first time since, the 2023 Act’s enactment, in Farrell v Salesforce (ADJ-00052842), the WRC upheld a complaint solely on the basis that the employer missed the initial 4-week response deadline under the 2023 Act. No compelling justification was offered for the delay. The substantive refusal reasons were issued after the complaint was filed and thus deemed irrelevant to the decision. Despite the relatively minor nature of the breach, the WRC awarded €1,000 in compensation.

The WRC’s role is narrowly defined: it assesses process, not substance. Under Section 27 of the 2023 Act, the WRC cannot question the merits of an employer’s decision or compel approval of a request. Its sole focus is whether the employer followed the statutory procedure – considering the application, responding on time, and giving written reasons. This reflects a clear legislative intent to preserve employer discretion, provided the process is fair, timely, and well-documented.

Prescribed Steps for Processing Remote Working Requests

Work Life Balance and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2023 – Sections 20 & 21

This article was drafted by Caitriona Montague (Associate).

The post “You Can Ask…”: Remote Working in Ireland Recap appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.

This year’s award builds on a strong tradition of success for the firm at the Irish Law Awards. Over the past decade, Alastair Purdy LLP has consistently been recognised among Ireland’s leading employment law practices, including:

• Employment Law Firm of the Year 2022

• Multiple regional awards for Employment Law Firm in Connacht and Ulster (2015, 2018, 2019, 2021, 2023, 2024 and 2025)

These accolades are a testament to the trust placed in us by our clients and the efforts of our exceptional team, whose expertise supports businesses across Ireland in navigating complex workplace challenges.

We extend our thanks to the organisers of the Irish Law Awards, the judging panel, and most importantly, our clients and colleagues for their continued support.

For more information about our employment law services, or to speak with a member of our team, please contact us today.

The post Alastair Purdy LLP Named National Employment Law Firm of the Year 2025 appeared first on Alastair Purdy LLP | Employment Law Firm Ireland | Irish Legal Advice.